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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals entered its decision on April 11, 2002. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3), and in accordance with Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals. The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported at Harris v.
Albrecht 2002 UT App 98, 46 P3d 241. A copy of the opinion is included in the
Addendum.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following issues were put at issue by the Court of Appeals and review by this
Court is therefore warranted:
I.

It is well-established in Utah law that the determination of whether a
contract exists is ultimately a question of law. R. 442.
A)

Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly hold that whether a contract to
procure insurance exists is ultimately a question of fact? Hams,
2002 UT App 98, % 29, n. 6, 46 P.3d 241.

II.

It is well-established in Utah law that the existence of a duty in tort is
ultimately a question of law. R. 420-419.
A)

Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly hold that the existence of a
duty of reasonable care to procure insurance was ultimately a
question of fact? Harris. 2002 UT App 98, Tf 29, n. 6, 46 P.3d 241.
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Both issues on appeal should be leviewed foi correctness and no defeience should
be afforded to the Court of Appeals' decision "[o]n certiorari, we review the decision of
the Court of Appeals, not the trial court We leview the Court of Appeals' decision for
correctness and give its conclusions of law no defeience " Carnei v Pto-Tech
Restoration. 944 P 2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997) (internal citations omitted)
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the only Rule lelevant to the
questions piesented for review It states
[Summary judgment] shall be lendeied if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any matenal fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
U R C P 56(c)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition
in the Lower Courts.

This case involves a dispute between Plaintiff Ken Hams ("Harris") and
Defendant Rick Albrecht ("Albrecht")* Hams claims that he requested Albrecht to
procure msuiance for his business, that subsequent thereto Hams' business was burned

1

Also Defendants aie Rick Albrecht Insuiance Agency, Inc , and State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co
2

by fire resulting in substantial damage, that Albrecht failed to procure the insurance that
Harris requested, and that this failure entitles Harris to recover damages. R. 10-1.2
This action was commenced by Hams on May 18, 1998, upon the filing of his
Complaint in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah. R. 10-1.
Harris alleged two causes of action in his Complaint: Negligence and Breach of Contract.
Id. On May 3, 2000, Albrecht filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with an
accompanying memorandum. R. 222-140. Harris filed an Objection and Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on June 30, 2000. R. 411230. Albrecht filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
on September 18, 2000, and the matter was submitted to the trial court on the same date.
R. 457-416, 459-458. The trial court heard oral arguments on the motion on October 11,
2000. The court found that Albrecht's Motion for Summary Judgment was well taken
and granted the motion. R. 467. The trial court issued a written Ruling on the judgment
on November 3, 2000. R. 488-485.
Harris filed a Notice of Appeal on November 29, 2000. R. 493. Defendants
moved for and were granted a Cost Judgment on November 17, 2000. R. 490-489.
2

The record is paginated so that the first page of a pleading or document is identified by
the higher chronological number. Hence, page 10 of the record is the first page of the
Complaint and page 1 is the last page. We will cite the number of the first page of a
pleading or document first for convenience to the Court and parties in finding the same.
Citations to deposition transcripts will be cited to the record page and then to the page of
the deposition referred to. For example, R. 183 (p. 18) refers to page 18 of the deposition
found on record page 183.
3

Harris filed an amended Notice of Appeal on December 15, 2001, appealing the judgment
granting summaiy judgment for the Defendants and appealing the Cost Judgment granted
for the Defendants. R. 502-501. On April 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision reversing the trial court's ruling. See Harris v. Albrecht 2002 UT App 98, 46
P.3d241.
On May 13, 2002, Albrecht filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court,
which was granted.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Rick Albrecht is an insurance agent, licensed in the State of Utah, and works for
Rick Albrecht Insurance Agency Inc. ("Agency"). R. 220. On October 1, 1993, the
Agency entered into an agreement with defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company
("State Farm") whereby the Agency was authorized to sell insurance policies for State
Farm. R. 124, 200.
i.

Plaintiffs Operation of Business For 17 Years Without Insurance.

Harris began working as a draftsman for architect Bruce Dixon in 1966 or 1967.
R. 186 (p. 11). He continued working as a draftsman until 1981, when he acquired his
own architect's license and became Dixon's partner. IcL (pp. 11-12). Hams participated
in the partnership until 1985, when he left to become an employee of Heritage Mountain
Ski Resort. R. 186 (p. 15).
Harris does not recall having any kind of business insurance during the time he
4

operated a partnership with Dixon. R. 186 (p. 15). In 1986, Hams formed a new
architectural firm with a new partner, George Olson, called u01son and Hams
Architects."3 Id (p. 16). The paitnership leased an office in Building 11 of Cottontree
Square in Provo, Utah. Id (p. 17). That paitnership operated until 1988 and ended when
Olson moved to another town. Id (p. 18). During the existence of "Olson and Harris
Architects," the partnership did not acquire any type of business insurance. Id ( p. 19).
When Olson left in 1988, Hams continued the architectural business in the same
building, employing many architects, draftsmen, and other employees. Id (pp. 18, 21);
R. 356 (pp. 42-51). Harris continued to operate his business without the protection of
insurance. R. 186 (p. 21).
Defendant Rick Albrecht met with Harris in 1989 for the puipose of completing an
application for homeowner's insurance. R. 186 (p. 66). During the visit, Albrecht
brought up the subject of obtaining a business policy for Hams' architectural business
which Harris did not want. R. 186 (pp. 83-84).
Approximately two years later, around 1991, Harris called Albrecht and asked him
to put together a quote for a business policy. R. 186 (pp. 84-89). Upon receiving Hams'
request, Albrecht claims he promptly prepared the quote, with some options for Hams to

3

During his deposition plaintiff was uncertain on the years of some of the events
described above and indicated the dates were accurately reflected in his resume. Plaintiff
subsequently produced a copy of his resume. Where there is conflict between the dates
stated in the deposition and the resume, the resume dates have been used.
5

choose from, and hand-delivered it to Hanis' office, where he left it with an employee.
R. 164 (pp. 78-80). Albrecht claims he called back a few days later to see if Harris had
received the quote and Hams said, though he understood he needed to obtain business
coverage, he didn't want to purchase coverage at that time. R. 164 (p. 79); R. 186 (pp.
86, 89, 93, 124). Hams doesn't remember ever receiving or reviewing the information
Albrecht left at his office. R. 186 (p. 91). However, Hanis does admit that, in 1991, it
was his decision not to acquire a business policy. R. 186 (pp. 86, 89, 93). Due to the
long period of time that has lapsed since the quote was given in 1991, Albrecht doesn't
remember any specifics about the quote and, likewise, Hanis remembers nothing about it
either. R. 186 (pp. 91-92); R. 164 (p. 103).
ii.

Destruction of Plaintiff s Property in Fire While Uninsured,

Approximately six years later, on December 1, 1997, a fire occurred in Building
11 of Cottontree Square. R. 7. Hams did not own the burned building, but he claims
most of the contents of his office were destroyed in the fire. R. 7. Harris values his lost
property at $1,143,855.50. R. 218. Of this amount, he claims $940,000.00 is attiibuted
to the loss of architectural plans and other valuable papers that were kept in his office.
Id
iii.

Harris' Claim to have "Ordered" Insurance Shortly
Before the Fire,

Harris filed the Complaint in this action on or about May 15, 1998, claiming that

6

defendants breached a contract to procure insurance coverage for his business and that
defendants negligently failed to procure insurance coverage. R. 10. Prior to the filing of
the lawsuit, Albrecht had no idea Hams thought he had purchased business insurance. R.
164 (p. 109). Hams' lawsuit stems entirely from a conversation he claims to have had
with Albrecht in the summer of 1997, five months before the fire, in which he claims to
have "ordered" business insurance after being uninsured for approximately 17 years. R.
186 (p. 107); R. 7.
Albrecht denies the alleged conversation took place. Nonetheless, because a
factual dispute exists on this point, for purpose of the motion for surnmaiy judgment only,
defendants agreed to assume the facts most favorable to plaintiff, believing even if a
conversation would have taken place of the type claimed by plaintiff (which it did not),
defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment. R. 216.
The alleged conversation was, according to Hams, veiy short. R. 186 (p. 107).
The entire alleged conversation consisted of only the following statements:
A. I called Mr. Albrecht and told him I wanted him to place
business coverage on my office and its contents, and he said
okay, he would take care of that, he would come out and look
at the equipment.
Q. How long did that conversation take?
A. Very short conversation.
Q. Was there anything said by either party more than what
you've just told me?
A. That was about it. He said he would get out there and
take a look at my equipment
*

#

7

*

MR. [LYNN] HARRIS: What he wants to know is, do you
have any general recollections of any asides or any other
comments that goes to other than what you've told him.
A. No.
*

*

*

Q. It's the sum total of what you remember as you sit here
today about that conversation?
A. Calling and asking him to insure my business and its
contents, and him telling me that he would come out and look
at the equipment.
Q. That's it?
A. As far as I remember.
R. 186 (pp. 107-109).
Harris testified that, following this single alleged conversation in 1997. he did not
have another conversation with Albrecht regarding business coverage prior to the time of
the fire approximately five months later. R. 186 (p. 123). Although Hams did call
Albrecht's office during this time period to discuss other insurance matters, he admittedly
did not bring up the subject of business insurance. R. 186 (pp. 123, 126-131).
iv.

Information and Decisions Not Supplied By Harris to
Albrecht.

Harris acknowledges that, in his abbreviated conversation with Albrecht, many
significant items were not discussed:
Q. Now, had you — trying to remember the verbiage you
used. You said you called him up, you wanted insurance for
— you said something like contents?
A. Business and contents.
Q. The business and contents. Is that the language you
recall using?
A. I believe so, yeah.
8

Q. Any conversation take place about your contents?
A. The conversation was limited to I will come out and look
at your stuff, look at your — look at your office.
Q. Any conversation about limits you wanted?
A. No.
Q. Any conversation about the deductible that you felt you'd
want?
A. No.
*

*

*

Q. Was there any conversation about ownership of the
building, who owned the building?
A. No. I've told you what the conversation was, and that's
all there was that I recall.
*

*

*

Q. You don't recall any conversation, then, about him asking
you what the value of your property would be?
A. No. That's why he was coming out to the office.
Q. And it's your testimony that he was going to come out
and value your property? Is that a yes?
A. Yes. I don't know whether he was going to come out and
evaluate my property. He was coming to my office.
Q. Did he have « were you asked if you wanted any kind of
coverage for loss of income?
A. We didn't discuss anything like that.
Q. Was there any conversation as to whether you'd like
business liability coverage to go along with that?
A. Didn't discuss anything like that.
Q. Whether you wanted some kind of medical payment
coverage?
A. Didn't discuss that.
Q. Whether you wanted coverage for your accounts
receivable?
A. No.
Q. Whether there were additional insureds?
A. No.
Q. Whether you wanted insurance for burglary or robbery?
A. No.
Q. Or earthquake insurance?
A. No.
9

Q. Did you have any kind of endorsement or provision that
would provide coverage for employee dishonesty of some
kind?
A. No.
Q. No conversation about that?
A. No.
Q. Any conversation about whether you had vehicles,
company vehicles that needed to be insured A. No.
Q. — or that you wanted insured?
A. No.
Q. Was there any conversation specifically about valuable
papers?
A. No.
*

*

*

Q. Did he ask you whether there's any property inside your
building that belonged to other people A. No.
Q. — that needed to be insured?
A. No.
Q. Was there any conversation about where the renewal bills
should be sent, who should get them?
A. No. He knows where I'm at, so — where we at? Which
year are we on now?
Q. I'm continuing with the '97 conversation.
A. No.
Q. Was there any conversation, continuing again with '97, as
to whether there was any liens on any of these — any of your
property and that there was someone that had a mortgage or
lien that would have to be named as an additional insured?
A. No.
Q. Any discussion about whether you used — about what
you did in there, whether you had wood burning stoves or did
cooking A. No.
Q. — or what activities were taking place?
A. No.
Q. Any discussion about the prior insurance you may have
had on that particular business?
10

A. No.
R. 186 (pp. 117-121).
v.

Five Month Period Between the Alleged Conversation
and the Fire.

During the 5 months that lapsed between the alleged conversation and the fire,
nothing else occuned to suggest that Harris had business insurance coverage. R. 186
(p. 123). Harris testified as follows:
Q I take it you never filled an insurance application out?
A. No.
Q. Never signed anything?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Never received any kind of bill A. No.
Q. - saying that — or never received a policy showing you
had business coverage?
A. Like I say, I don't look at everything that comes into my
office from Rick. There's a lot of stuff that he sent us. I paid
the bills, and it just wasn't my policy to — or it wasn't my
habit to look at all of that stuff that came.
Q. You have said that, and my question is, do you recall
receiving a business policy?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall receiving any kind of a bill showing that
you had business coverage?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall receiving any kind of document showing
the amounts of certain types of business coverage and the
amount you were going to be charged for business coverage?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember ever making a payment for business
coverage?
A. No, I don't.

11

R. 173 (pp. 121-122).
Harris did not set an appointment with Albrecht to come look at the property and
Harris is not aware of Albrecht ever having come to look at the business premises. R.
186 (p. 109). Harris also acknowledges he did not call Albrecht to check on whether the
"ordered" insurance had been procured. R. 186 (p. 123).
vi.

Information and Decisions Needed To Procure A Business
Insurance Policy.

Each business policy is unique and tailored to the needs and requests of the
respective business and its owner. R. 159 (pp. 33, 35, 51-52, 83-84). There is no such
thing as a "standard" business policy.4 IcL For example, some businesses may only want
to insure their office furniture. R. 159 (p. 35). Others may want to insure against theft,
mechanical breakdown, or a myriad of other losses. R. 209. Furthermore, the amounts of
insurance desired for each particular type of coverage vaiy greatly from business to
business, as can most of the other insurance terms, kf
A request for "full coverage" in connection with a business policy is insufficient to
convey to an underwriter the types and quantities of coverages desired. R. 159 (pp. 5253). In order for Harris to acquire a business policy through State Farm for his architect
business, he would have to supply State Farm with a significant amount of information.

4

If the words "standard" or "basic" have been used by the parties in the record
below, it only means that there are certain general coverages that are typically provided if
and when all the terms necessary for a contract have been supplied by the applicant.
12

R. 159. Hams would have to decide on the types of coverages to include in the business
policy. Among other information required, Hanis would need to state whether he wanted
the following coverages:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XL

Loss of income;
Earthquake;
Burglary and robbery;
Employee dishonesty;
Hired auto liability;
Mechanical breakdown;
Inland Marine (provides broader coverage for CAD Systems);
Theft;
Money and Securities;
Exterior Signs;
Extra Expense.

R. 137 flf 4); R. 159 (pp. 45-48, 50-54, 57-59, 81-84, 112-114).
In order to obtain a business insurance policy from State Farm, Harris would also
have to decide whether he wanted to insure his property at actual cash value or at
replacement cost. R. 137 fl[ 5); R. 159 (pp. 50, 57). Harris would have to choose
between a "named perils" policy or an "all risks" policy. R. 159 (pp. 50-54). Harris
would have to decide on the amount of protection (ie. policy limits) he wanted for the
coverages he had selected, and also the amount of liability and medical payment coverage
he wanted. R. 137 (<[} 6). Harris would have to provide infonnation on the personal
property he was insuring and the value of that property. R. 137 fl[ 7). For instance,
depending on the coverages selected, State Farm would need to know the value of:
I.

All furniture and equipment on site;
13

II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

Plaintiffs valuable papers;
Plaintiffs accounts receivable;
Property belonging to others that is kept on site;
Improvements made by plaintiff to the building;
Any exterior signs;
Plaintiffs average monthly inventory, if any;

VIII. Cash, checks, and securities kept on hand.
R. 137 flj 7); R. 159 (pp. 55-57, 63, 72).
Harris would have to provide various types of information about his business
activities, depending on the coverages selected, such as:
I.
The percentage of business conducted off-premises;
II.
The number of architects employed;
III.
The age of the business;
IV.
Whether he owns or leases other business locations;
V.
Whether he engages in any non-architectural operations;
VI.
The hours the business is open;
VII. Whether any cooking is done on the premises;
VIII. Whether daily bank deposits are made;
IX.
The maximum amount of cash on-hand and the amount kept
overnight;
X.
Whether measures are taken by plaintiff to prevent employee theft;
XL
Whether plaintiffs accounts receivable are kept in metal receptacles;
XII. Whether plaintiffs valuable papers are kept in a fireproof container
and whether copies are kept off-site,
R. 137 (^f 8). Harris would also have to provide information about the building and its
safety features. R. 137 fl[ 9). Some of this could be obtained by the agent's inspection of
the property. Id However, other information would have to be supplied by Harris, such

I.
II.

The age of the building;
The types of burglar and fire alarms on the premises, if any;
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III.
IV.

The number of fire extinguishers on site;
Whether the building had ever been remodeled or converted;

V.

Whether plaintiff has a safe.

Id. Harris would also have needed to inform State Farm of any additional parties to be
included on the policy as additional insureds. R. 137 fl[ 10). In commercial lease
situations such as Harris', it would not be unusual for the lease agreement to require the
lessee to include his landlord as an additional insured. Id Similarly, someone with a
security agreement in the equipment or furniture might need to be listed as an insured. IdL
Harris would have had to decide on his deductible and agree to pay the total
premium payment. R. 137 fl[ 11). He would have to decide when he wanted the policy
to go into effect. R. 137 fl[ 12). He would have to explain why his business had never
been insured and state whether he had been denied insurance by another insurer. R. 137
fl[ 13). He would have to disclose any prior losses he may have had, regardless of
whether they were insured or not. R. 137 fl[ 14).
The information supplied by plaintiff would be written on the insurance
application. R. 137 flf 15). A tine and correct copy of the State Farm business policy
application used in 1997 is found in the Addendum hereto, Appendix D. Once the
application was completed, plaintiff would have to sign the application and make a
payment at that time. R. 137 fl[ 16). State Farm would use all of the above information
to decide whether to insure Harris and to determine the amount of the final premium. R.
137 fl[ 17).
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vii. Valuable Paper Coverage.
Among other things, Hams is seeking $940,000.00 from defendants for
architectural plans allegedly destroyed in the fire. R. 205, 390. State Farm's business
policy comes with $5,000 of coverage for valuable papers.5 R. 159 (pp. 17, 61).
Albrecht had authority to increase valuable paper coverage up to $25,000. Id. If
coverage was increased, an additional premium was charged. R. 159 (p. 143).
If a customer wanted valuable paper coverage greater than $25,000, an agent
couldn't bind coverage, but instead would have to submit the entire application to State
Farm "for inquiry only." R. 164 (p. 101). The non-bind status would apply to the entire
policy, not just to the valuable paper coverage in that policy. An agent cannot bind
partial coverage. R. 159 (pp. 76-77). At that point the request for coverage would be
forwarded to a State Farm Field Underwriter with division-level underwriting authority.
R. 159 (pp. 21-25, 61). The field underwriter would inspect the property, implement loss
mitigation and control procedures, and then determine whether State Farm would issue
the additional valuable paper insurance. R. 159 (p. 28).
Before underwriting valuable papers in an amount exceeding $25,000, the field

5

By saying that "State Farm's business policy comes with $5,000 of coverage for
valuable papers," it is meant once all of the terms and information have been supplied,
and if State Farm agrees to insure, then there is $5,000 of coverage for valuable papers
without the insured needing to specifically make that option. Anything over $5,000
would have to be opted for and a higher premium paid. R. 159 (pp. 17, 61, 143); R. 365362.
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underwriter would implement loss control measures. Specifically, he would refuse to
underwrite the papers unless: a) they were kept in a fireproof safe or container on the
businesses premises, and b) duplicate copies were kept in a secure location off premises.
These requirements would extend to paper plans and computer (CAD) architectural plans.
R. 159 (pp. 64-71, 76-78, 118). Hams admits he did not store his architectural plans in a
fireproof container on site, nor did he keep backup copies of his plans off site. R. 186
(pp. 183-185).
Harris identified the insurance policies he previously obtained through Albrecht as
being exclusively personal lines of insurance (i.e., family automobile policies, a
homeowner's policy, boat insurance, R. V. insurance, and a personal liability umbrella
policy). R. 274, 286-85, 331. Harris did not show that any of these could be used to
imply the terms for a business policy. Harris said that the terms of the business insurance
policy can be supplied by using a State Farm sales brochure, but Hams does not even
recall ever seeing a brochure before the commencement of this action, as the trial court
aptly noted. R. 445, 486. No personalized information for Harris was included in the
brochure, and the brochure stated it was just a general description, not a contract. R. 36563.
With these facts in mind, the trial court found that Albrecht's Motion for Summary
Judgment was well taken and granted the motion. R. 467. The trial court granted
Albrecht's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that Harris had not conveyed to
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Albrecht sufficient detail to create a duty, contractual or otherwise, to procure insurance.
R. 488-86.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment, holding that:
what this court was called upon to decide was whether the facts taken in the
light most favorable to Harris preclude summary judgment. Whether a
contract to procure insurance or a duty to procure a policy of insurance
ultimately exists, are questions of fact best left to the trier of fact. In sum,
we do not decide today that a contract or a duty exists, merely that Harris
has presented a genuine issue of fact as to whether either exists, which was
necessary to satisfy the hurdle of summary judgment.
Harris v. Albrecht, 2002 UT App 98, % 29, n.6, 46 P.3d 241 (emphasis added).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court held that, as a matter of law. Albrecht owed no duty, through
contract or tort, to procure insurance on Hams' behalf. R. 487-86. The Utah Court of
Appeals, however, disagreed and held that "[w]hether a contract to procure insurance or a
duty to procure a policy of insurance ultimately exists, are questions of fact best left to
the trier of fact." Harris v. Albrecht 2002 UT App 98, If 29, n. 6, 46 P.3d 241.
This pronouncement by the Court of Appeals is in direct conflict with established
Utah case law. As noted by Justice Davis in his dissent, the issue of whether a duty or
contract exists is ultimately a question of law. Id. at If 31.
While it is true that the jury may have to resolve "subsidiary issues of fact" before
the court can make a legal detennination regarding the existence of a contract or duty, no
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disputed subsidiaiy facts existed for purposes of Albrecht's summary judgment motion.
R. 216 flf 19). Consequently, the only issue that went before the trial court was purely a
legal one, which asked whether, based on the facts as alleged by Harris, Albrecht had a
duty or contract to procure insurance.
As with all contracts and duties, it is the province of the court to decide whether
certain undisputed words and actions are sufficient to give rise to a legal obligation,
including an obligation to procure insurance. Based on the undisputed facts of this case,
there was insufficient detail, as a matter of law, to trigger a duty or contract to procure
insurance.
DETAILED ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HARRIS AND
ALBRECHT FORMED A CONTRACT TO PROCURE
INSURANCE IS ULTIMATELY A QUESTION OF FACT,

A.

Under Utah Law, Whether a Contract Has Been Formed Is
Ultimately a Question of Law.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the question of whether a contract to
procure insurance has been formed is ultimately a question of fact. As noted by Justice
Davis in his dissenting opinion in this case, "whether a contract has been formed, based
on a given set of facts, is also a question of law." Harris v. Albrecht 2002 UT App 98,
1J31, 46 P.3d 241 (Davis, J., dissenting). Justice Davis' statement is a recitation of the
well-established mle announced by this Court that "[w]hether a contract has been formed
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is ultimately a conclusion of law. . .." Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 1999
UT 100,1fl7, 989 P.2d 1077 (emphasis added). Absent Albrecht's Motion for Summary
Judgment, there may have been subsidiary issues of fact regarding the intent of the parties
or whether the alleged phone conversation ever took place. However, the way Albrecht
framed his Motion for Summary Judgment, none of those facts were placed at issue. This
is why Justice Davis in his dissent stated that Albrecht's Motion for Summary Judgment
was "based on a given set of facts." Harris. 2002 UT App 98, p i , 46 P.3d 241 (Davis,
J., dissenting). Therefore, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the question of
whether a contract to procure insurance has been formed is ultimately a question of fact.
B.

Under Utah Law, Whether Albrecht and Harris Had a
Definite, Enforceable Meeting of the Minds on the Essential
Terms of a Contract to Procure Is a Pure Question of Law.

Under Utah law, whether Albrecht and Harris had a definite, enforceable meeting
of the minds on the essential terms of a contract to procure is a pure question of law. The
legal question before the Court of Appeals was whether, under Hams' version of the facts
and all favorable inferences, the parties had a meeting of the minds on the essential terms
of a contract to procure, or whether no such meeting of the minds took place and the
terms were too indefinite to be enforceable:
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient defmiteness to be enforced.
Valcarce v. Bitters. 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 1961); see also Nunley. 1999 UT 100,
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TJ22, 989 P.2d 1077 ("An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite . . .'");
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 2d § 33 (1979) ("Even though a manifestation of
intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a
contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.'"); 1 Joseph M. Perillo et
al.? Corbin on Contracts § 4.3, at 569 (rev. ed. 1993). Thus, the question in the present
case was whether the alleged contract to procure between Albrecht and Hams
demonstrated a meeting of the minds sufficiently definite to be enforceable.
Whether the parties' alleged agreement spells out a "meeting of the minds" on the
essential terms sufficiently definite to be enforceable is a question that can only be
determined by a court as a matter of law:
Although the terms of a contract need not be stated in the minutest detail, it
is requisite to enforceability that it must evidence a meeting of the minds
upon the essential features of the agreement.... [T]he question whether
the contract as interpreted by the trier of fact is sufficiently definite and
certain in its essential terms to give rise to a legal obligation is a question of
law. . . . Whether a certain or undisputed state of facts establishes a contract
is one of law for the court . . .
Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Stone, 35 Cal. App. 3d 396, 407 (1973) (brackets and
quotations omitted); see also Nunlev, 1999 UT 100, ^ 23, n. 3, 989 P.2d 1077 ("As a
matter of law, the parties failed to create a legally enforceable contract because they did
not agree upon terms material to the contract."); Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Valley
Bank and Trust Company, 224 F.3d 1195, 1999-2000 (10th Cir. 2000) (construing Utah
law, court states that meeting of minds essential to formation of contract, and "whether an
21

enforceable contract exists is a question of law"). Because the determination of whether
a definite meeting of the minds on the essential terms of a contact to procure is a pure
question of law, there was no reason for the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the
jury and the case should have been resolved on summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals' decision to entrust the "given set of facts" to a jury for a
determination regarding legal duty was incorrect. Where the facts constituting the alleged
contract to procure are undisputed, and where defmiteness of essential terms is lacking,
the claim should be dismissed by the court on summary judgment or motion to dismiss,
for that is what "matter of law" implies. For instance, in Furtak v. Moffett 671 N.E.2d
827 (111. Ct. App. 1996), the plaintiffs claimed to have requested that the defendant
insurance agent "fully cover" their home from fire and other loss. The plaintiffs argued
that the agent had thus contracted to procure insurance. When the home was consumed
by fire, a claim was made for insurance proceeds. Only a small part of the loss was
covered rather than the "full coverage" the plaintiffs had requested and the plaintiffs
therefore sued to recover the difference.
The insurance agent moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that "a question of fact exists as to whether defendants
breached an oral contract to procure an insurance policy that would fully cover their
home." IcL at 258. The appellate court rejected "the existence of disputed facts"
argument, holding that even if there was a dispute on some facts, it was undisputed that
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the words "fully cover" were "simply too vague to be enforceable." Id at 259. Thus,
the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment on the contract to procure claim.
Similarly, in Schults v. Griffen-Rahn Insurance Agency. 550 N.E.2d 232 (111. Ct.
App. 1990), the plaintiff had asked the insurance agent to be covered in a "reasonable
amount" for uninsured motorist coverage. When the plaintiff was injured in an
automobile accident, the amount of uninsured motorist coverage the agent procured
turned out to be just a fraction of what could have procured, and the plaintiff brought suit
for breach of a contract to procure insurance. The trial court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss and the appellate court affirmed on the basis that the promise to
procure a "reasonable amount" of insurance was too indefinite to be enforceable, there
being no meeting of the minds regarding the essential terms:
[A]n agreement to procure reasonable amounts of coverage is
unenforceable. In the context of insurance coverage, a "reasonable
amount" is an ambiguous phrase not subject to any definite or certain
interpretation. . . . [W]here certainty is lacking in the essential terms of the
contract, the court will not supply the missing essential terms. . .
Accordingly, since the material terms are unascertainable, the court's
decision to dismiss the contract counts is proper.
Id at 236.
Therefore, the question of whether Hams' alleged contract to procure is
sufficiently definite to be enforceable is a question of law that is properly dealt with on
summaiy judgment or other dispositive motion. Many of the cases in which courts have
held a contact to procure unenforceable have been on directed verdict after presentation
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of some evidence to determine what the terms of the contract were. However, in Moffett,
the court accepted plaintiffs' contract terms as true, and therefore the court could pass
straight to the legal determination of specificity. There was nothing to try. Like Moffett,
Albrecht concedes the terms and all favorable inferences of Hams' alleged contract to
procure for purposes of argument, and therefore there is no need to try the facts first in
order to reach the legal issue. Like Moffett, Albrecht's Motion for Summary Judgment
can be decided as a matter of law.
Because the issue of whether Albrecht and Harris had a definite, enforceable
meeting of the minds on the essential terms of a contract to procure is a pure question of
law, and because that determination was based on a given set of facts, the Court of
Appeals incorrectly decided to remand this case to the jury.
C,

The Facts as Set Forth by Harris Fail as a Matter of Law to
Set Forth the Essential Elements of an Enforceable Contract
to Procure, and the Court of Appeals Should Have Therefore
Affirmed the Trial Court's Granting of Summary Judgment.

The facts as set forth by Harris fail to create an enforceable contract as a matter of
law, and the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the trial court's granting of summaiy
judgment. This Court has not had occasion to decide what the integral features of a
contract to procure insurance should be. However, there is a well-established standard in
other jurisdictions that a contract to procure requires an express or implied meeting of the
minds upon the essential terms of the policy. See, e.g., Stockberger v. Meridian Mut. Ins.
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Co., 395 N.E.2d 1272, 1279 (Ind. App. 1979). Therefore, a general request for insurance
coverage, without agreement on the essential elements of the insurance contract to be
procured, does not give rise to a duty to procure an insurance policy. In such situations
the courts have consistently held that, even if an agent states he will comply with a
customer's vague request for insurance, a duty to procure does not attach because the
parties have not had a "meeting of the minds" on the essential terms of the insurance
contract to be procured. Absent a meeting of the minds, the agent does not know what to
procure.
In Wallis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 465 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), the
plaintiffs had placed all of their insurance with Liberty Mutual for years. Id at 423. The
plaintiffs "were not knowledgeable about insurance and depended on Liberty and the
agent assigned to them to suggest whatever insurance coverage they needed." Id The
plaintiffs experienced a theft in one of their warehouses and reported the loss to their
insurance company. Plaintiffs were informed they had no coverage for theft. After that,
the plaintiffs told Liberty's agent they "wanted coverage against any similar loss" for
each of their three warehouses and stores. Id at 424. Plaintiffs instructed the agent "to
cover them the best way he saw fit." Id
Two weeks later a second theft occurred at the same warehouse. Upon learning
they still didn't have coverage for theft, the plaintiffs filed suit against Liberty and its
agent for negligently failing to procure insurance. After trial, a judgment was entered for
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the plaintiffs. However, the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found
that, in order to establish a duty, the plaintiffs first had to show the defendants had agreed
to insure them. IcL at 426. The court stated that "under general contract law, which is
applicable to insurance contracts, there must be an offer and acceptance to evidence a
complete agreement, or no obligations arise." Id The court found that, while the
statements of the parties evidenced the plaintiffs desire to be insured, they did not
constitute a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of an insurance contract. Id,
Specifically, the court found there were many essential terms that had not been discussed
or agreed upon, and consequently no claim existed:
They needed data concerning the volume of plaintiffs' sales at their three
different retail outlets, the amounts of inventory at each of them, the nature
of the merchandise at the various locations, whether such locations in the
three cities were in a good or bad part of town, what 'deductibles1 were
desired; i.e., what portions of the losses the plaintiffs would be willing to
bear in order to obtain reduced premiums, the nature and extent of prior
theft losses, the type and existence vel non of burglar alarm systems at the
various locations, where the various exhibitions were held and the value of
the merchandise plaintiffs would have there, as well as the means of
transporting the same, and whether they would be left overnight or locked
in a room; whether plaintiffs would want a one or three year policy; what
limits of liability would be desired at the several locations to be insured; the
limits of liability for transportation coverage, etc. Such an application might
have been accepted or rejected; there was no duty on the part of the
defendants to accept it.
Id at 426.
The court also stated that the defendants had not received sufficient information
upon which to base a refusal or to write the insurance when the second loss occurred.
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Under those circumstances the court held there was no duty to insure or notify.
Similarly, in Stockberger v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co.. 395 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979), an insurance broker had written numerous automobile policies for the
plaintiff, who had owned 10 vehicles throughout his life. Id at 1278. The plaintiff asked
the broker to transfer one of his policies to another truck. The broker agreed the truck
should be insured. He requested the serial number of the truck and the plaintiff testified
he later provided it. See id at 1274. No additional information was provided to the
broker. The policy was never transferred and approximately three months later the truck
was involved in an accident. The plaintiff sued the broker and the insurance company for
failing to transfer the policy, alleging both breach of contract and negligence. When the
trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the broker the plaintiff appealed. The
appellate court affirmed the dismissal, stating that, in order to state a claim for failure to
procure insurance, the plaintiff had to demonstrate "a meeting of the minds of the parties
upon the . . . essential elements of a contract." Id at 1279. The court also stated that:
[T]he liability of the agent for failure to procure insurance obviously
could not arise unless the agent had sufficiently definite directions from
the principal to enable the agent to consummate the final insurance
contract.
While an implied contract to procure or renew insurance may arise in
certain situations based on prior dealings between the parties, there is a
corresponding duty on the part of the insured to provide the agent or broker
with the information necessary to implement the policy. An agent or broker
is not liable when the insured's loss is due to the insured's own act or
omission.
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Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
The court concluded the directed verdict was proper as: "there was no meeting of
the minds upon the subject matter of the insurance coverage. . . . It necessarily follows
that [plaintiff] did not establish a breach of contract or breach of an ensuing duty by
[defendant]." Id at 1279-80.
In Rodgers v. Andersen Machinery, 316 P.2d 497 (Or. 1956), Andersen sought
insurance for its rental equipment. Andersen instructed its insurance agent to obtain an
insurance policy that insured Andersen for "any contingency that might arise on the rental
fees, fire, upset, theft, or mysterious disappearance" of the equipment. Id at 502. The
agent agreed to provide the insurance. Id Ten-months later some of Andersen's
equipment was stolen, and Andersen learned that insurance had never been obtained.
Andersen sued the agent for breach of a contract to procure insurance. The jury found in
favor of Andersen, but the judgment was set aside by the trial court and judgment was
entered in favor of the agent. The appellate court affirmed, stating:
[T]he evidence offered by the defendant wholly failed to establish a valid
contract. . . . What variety of risks the witness had in mind when he used
the term 'any contingency that involved the rental fees' we do not know,
but we believe the language is entirely too indefinite to form the basis for a
valid contract to procure insurance.
No testimony was offered to prove either the amount of the indemnity, the
duration of the risk or the premium to be paid for the policy. The evidence
was even indefinite as to the property to be insured. . . .
*

*
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*

The evidence offered by [Andersen] was wholly lacking in that degree of
clarity necessaiy to prove a contract to procure insurance. We are satisfied
that the court did not err in entering judgment for the plaintiff
notwithstanding the verdict of the jury in favor of [Andersen] on its
counterclaim.
Id. at 502-503 (citations and quotations omitted).
The authorities cited above are consistent with numerous other court opinions
addressing similar issues. See, e.g.. Small v. King, 915 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Wyo. 1996)
("an agent's duty to provide correct coverage cannot be tiiggered by a client's request for
'full coverage' because the request is not a specific inquiry about a specific type of
coverage"); Boston Camping Distributor Co., Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 282
N.E.2d 374, 376 (Mass. 1972) (plaintiffs statement that "he wanted insurance coverage
from A to Z, second to none," along with the agent's statement that he would comply, did
not create contract to procure insurance and directed verdict for defendant was upheld);
Dickerson v. Conklin, 235 S.E.2d 450 (Va. 1977) (plaintiffs request for immediate
coverage for his automobile, coupled with agent's repeated assurances that "as of right
now you are covered," did not establish a meeting of the minds on the essential elements
of an insurance contract, mandating that judgment for plaintiff be reversed).
It is absolutely undisputed that Harris did not identify for Albrecht the "contents"
of his business. Further, none of the other essential terms of a contract to procure were
discussed, e.g., period, amount, rate, premium, etc., nor could any of those terms be
implied from Harris' personal lines of insurance, such as his automobile insurance.
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Therefore, lacking the essential features, there was no contract to procure insurance as a
matter of law. The absence of the essential features is demonstrated as follows.
1.

Harris' Alleged Conversation with Albrecht Did Not
Create an Agreement on the Essential Terms of a Business
Policy,

Harris asserts that Albrecht had a duty to procure business insurance based on an
alleged conversation they had in 1997. Harris has testified:
I called Mr. Albrecht and told him I wanted him to place
business coverage on my office and its contents, and he said
okay, he would take care of that, he would come out and look
at the equipment.
R. 176 (p. 107). Assuming Hams' testimony as true, the above conversation would not
establish a sufficiently definite agreement or undertaking such as would constitute a
contract to procure. Indeed, the conversation is completely void of virtually all essential
terms. A substantial amount of information would have to be exchanged and many
decisions made by Harris before the parties could reach an agreement. R. 159.
First, Harris would have to decide which types of coverage he wanted for his
business. A portion of the coverages available include coverage for loss of income,
earthquake, burglaiy and robbery, theft, money and securities, extra expense, mechanical
breakdown, hired auto liability, and employee dishonesty. R. 137 fl[ 4); R. 159 (pp. 4548, 50-54, 57-59, 81-84, 112-114). Until Harris directed what items and coverage he
wanted, the subject matter of the alleged insurance contract and the risks insured against
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would not have been agreed upon; and defendants would not have been able to calculate a
premium, make a decision whether to insure certain risks, or decide whether to issue a
policy.
Second, Harris would have to decide the amount of coverage he wanted for each
type of coverage obtained. For example, with respect to valuable papers, Harris would
have to decide whether he wanted the $5,000 available under the basic policy6 or whether
he wanted additional coverage. R. 159 (pp. 17, 61). If additional coverage was
requested, Harris would have needed to disclose how much his valuable papers were
worth. R. 159 (pp. 17, 61, 143). That information could only be supplied by Harris.
Furthermore, Albrecht only had authority to offer increased valuable paper coverage up to
$25,000, so if Harris wanted coverage beyond that amount, coverage could not have been
bound, but rather the application would have been submitted "for inquiry only" to State
Farm's underwriting officials, who would have decided whether to approve the additional
coverage. R. 164 (p. 101); 159 (pp. 21-25, 61). Given the fact that Harris5 valuable
papers were not kept in a fireproof safe and were not backed-up off site, an application
containing a request for valuable paper coverage exceeding $25,000 would have been
denied. R. 159 (pp. 28, 64-71, 76-78, 118); R. 186 (pp. 185-183). If no insurance could
have been obtained, "then a duty to procure insurance could not have been breached" and
6

By saying "basic policy" it is meant that there are certain general coverages that
are typically provided if and when all the terms necessaiy for a contract have been
supplied by the applicant
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summary judgment is appropriate. See Haggans v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 803 So.
2d 1249, 1252 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
Third, Harris would have had to provide comprehensive information to enable
Defendants to determine whether State Farm would insure him, and if so, the amount of
the premium that would have been charged. Defendants needed detailed information on
the property Harris wanted to insure, the value of that property, the deductible, the
activities being conducted, the building being occupied, the parties to be insured, any
prior losses, the reason the business had never been insured, and whether Hams had ever
been denied insurance. R. 137-32; R. 159 (pp. 55-57, 63, 72).
The undisputed facts show that Hams never gave any of this information to
Defendants. If the above information had been exchanged and agreed upon, Defendants
would have been able to determine whether a policy could be issued and, if so, the
premium to be charged for the policy. In the absence of this information, however, a
meeting of the minds could not exist. Simply put, Defendants could not have agreed to
insure Harris' business until they knew what it was they were insuring.
Given the substantial amount of information needed, the alleged agreement to
obtain insurance for Harris' "business and its contents" falls far short of constituting a
meeting of the minds on the essential elements of a contract to procure. Harris'
admittedly vague request for insurance was "expressive of present intention but was not
in its effect a contract." Boston Camping Dist. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 282
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N.E.2d 374, 376 (Mass. 1972). The alleged statement "looked to the making of a contract
but cannot be regarded as a part of the contract that was made." Id Thus, in the absence
of an agreement to procure insurance, Hams' claim must fail.
2.

Albrecht's Prior Dealings with Harris Provide No Basis
for Implying the Information Required for a Commercial
Business Insurance Policy.

Harris argues that the terms of a business policy can be established from his
dealings with Albrecht on personal lines of insurance. Hams identified the insurance
policies he previously obtained through Albrecht as being exclusively personal lines of
insurance (i.e., family automobile policies, a homeowner's policy, boat insurance, R.V.
insurance, and a personal liability umbrella policy). R. 274, 286-85, 331. However,
Harris has failed to show how his dealings on these personal lines of insurance could
have possibly supplied Albrecht with the information he needed to acquire a business
policy. Harris provided no evidence or facts suggesting that his personal policies
contained information regarding what business property Hams owned and wanted to
insure, what types of risks he wanted to insure against, the amount of coverage he wanted
for each type of coverage obtained (including valuable paper coverage), the value of
Harris' property, the number of employees, whether Hams wanted to insure at
replacement cost or actual cost value, etc.
While Albrecht may have been able to handle, on occasion, some personal
insurance issues with limited information, the same is not true for business insurance. An
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existing automobile policy can easily be moved to a newly-acquired vehicle with just a
phone call. The same cannot be said for business policies. The parties prior dealings did
not establish a sufficiently definite agreement or undertaking such as would constitute a
contract to procure.
3.

The Terms of a Business Insurance Policy Cannot Be
Supplied by the Sales Brochure or from a "Standard
Policy" Obtained During Discovery.

Harris has argued that the terms of the business insurance policy can be supplied
by using a State Farm sales brochure. Hams' argument is curious as he does not recall
ever seeing the brochure before the commencement of this action and he did not rely on it
to make decisions about the coverage he wanted. Harris' reliance on the brochure,
therefore, cannot provide a basis for finding that there was a meeting of the minds. It has
been stated that "[i]t is well settled in the law of insurance that, ordinarily, an
advertisement issues for the purpose of soliciting insurance does not constitute a part of
the contract when not attached to the policy or referred to in it." Knapp v. Independence
Life & Accid. Ins. Co.. 118 S.E.2d 631 (W.Va. 1961) (quoting 29 Am. Jur., Insurance §
270).
Because Hams did not see the sales brochure prior to this lawsuit and because that
sales brochure did not provide any of the personalized information needed to place a
business insurance policy, R. 365-63, Harris cannot rely on the brochure to show that
there was a meeting of the minds.
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In summary, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the trial court's legal
determination that there was no contract to procure as a matter of law. Even under
Harris5 view of the facts, the essential terms of the contract to procure had not been
established. Therefore, there was no contract to procure insurance as a matter of law.
D.

If the Court of Appeals9 Decision Were Allowed to Stand,
the Trier of Fact's Deliberation on Damages Would Be Left
to Impermissible Speculation Because the Terms of the
Contract Were Never Agreed To.

The Court of Appeals' decision, if allowed to stand, would set a dangerous
precedent regarding damages. The jury would have to guess the amount of coverage
Harris wanted for valuable papers. The jury would have to guess whether Harris would
have wanted $5,000 or whether he would have been willing to pay for additional
coverage, which only went up to $25,000 under Albrechf s authority. This is far less than
the nearly $940,000 worth of papers Harris claims to have lost. The jury would have to
guess whether State Farm would insure Harris, what the premium would be, the limits,
the deductibles, the term, etc.
Because the jury could only fashion a remedy based on speculation, the Court of
Appeals should not have sent this case back to the jury. R. 504. "A court is no oracle to
divine assent where assent is wanting." Dickerson v. Conklin, 235 S.E.2d 450, 455 (Va.
1977); see also Wagner v. Falbe. 74 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1956).

35

E.

The Parties' Alleged Actions Amounted to Little More than
an Inquiry about Insurance, and the Court of Appeals Should
Have Affirmed the Trial Court's Granting of Summary Judgment

Justice Davis was correct in pointing out that the parties' actions were preliminary,
or, "amounted to little more than an inquiiy about insurance." Harris, 2002 UT App 98, ^
39, 46 P.3d 241. Where an inquiiy or discussion regarding procuring insurance leaves
essential terms for future negotiation, there is no contract to procure. See Lewis v. Pike,
663 P.2d 91, 92-93 (Utah 1983) (prospective insured acknowledged that a decision had to
be made regarding whether joint insurance was desired, and when death occurred prior to
making that decision, this Court found that no specific order had been placed); see also
Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 2000)
(parties consummated "[an] agreement to agree, which was 'unenforceable because [it]
leaves open material terms for future consideration, and the courts cannot create these
terms for the parties'").
Here, it is undisputed that the alleged conversation left material terms open for
future consideration, as it is Harris' direct testimony that Albrecht said he would be
coming out to look at Albrecht's "equipment," "stuff," and "office." R. 186 (pp. 107109, 117-121). Thus, Hams' alleged phone conversation, at best, was preliminary
negotiation or, an unenforceable "agreement to agree." As was stated in Boston Camping
Dist Co, v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 282 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Mass. 1972), the alleged
statement "looked to the making of a contract but cannot be regarded as a part of the
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contract that was made." IcL
F.

Case Law Cited by the Utah Court of Appeals Is
Distinguishable from the Facts of this Case and Should
Serve as No Impediment to this Court Reversing the
Court of Appeals,

The Utah Court of Appeals found that three cases were helpful in deciding that
summary judgment should be denied. However, this case law cited by Utah Court of
Appeals is distinguishable from the facts of this case and should serve as no impediment
to this court reversing the Court of Appeals.
In Massengale v. Hicks, 639 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. App. 1982), the plaintiff held an
insurance policy on a 1975 Pontiac which had been purchased through the defendant
insurance agent. Defendant had been the insurance agent for plaintiff for many years and
had taken care of all of plaintiff s insurance needs. Sometime in July of 1977, plaintiff
received a Notice of Non-renewal which stated that the policy would expire at 12:01 a.m.
Standard Time on September 12, 1977. On that day, between 9:30 p.m and 10:00 p.m.
plaintiff was involved in a auto-accident. Plaintiff filed a claim with defendant, who later
notified plaintiff that the claim was denied.
On appeal, the court found that Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict
because "there [was] an abundance of evidence from which a jury could find that
[defendant] did agree to procure replacement insurance." IcL at 660. This evidence
included, four occasions in which plaintiffs wife discussed the insurance policy with
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defendant, and two occasions in which Plaintiff, himself, discussed replacing the policy.
The facts of Massengale are distinguishable from the case at hand. Most
importantly, Massengale involved the replacement or renewal of a recently expired policy
and there were no issues regarding what was being insured. In this case, however, there
was no prior business policy in which Albrecht could simply renew. Also, in
Massengale, numerous conversations took place between the parties prior to the policy's
expiration. While the court did not lay out exactly what was discussed in those
conversations, it is likely the court found them to contribute to the "abundance of
evidence" it believed enabled a jury to find the existence of an agreement to procure
insurance. In this case, however, the parties conversation about business insurance was
general and nondescript.
Furthermore, unlike the present case where the issue is whether certain undisputed
facts contain sufficient detail to give rise to enforceable contract, the issue in Massengale
was whether the parties' conversations were intended by the parties to be an agreement
for the agent to renew an existing policy. The jury was not deliberating on the legal
question of whether the conversations themselves contained sufficient detail regarding
what to procure, but rather, it was deliberating on the factual question of whether the
parties had intended or agreed that the agent would procure a replacement for an existing
policy.
The Court of Appeals also relied on the decision in Lawrence v. Francis, 267
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S.W.2d 306 (Ark. 1954), wherein the plaintiff brought suit against Mr. Lawrence, an
insurance agent and real estate agent, after he failed to obtain insurance in accordance
with an agreement he had with the plaintiff. In Lawrence, the plaintiff sought to purchase
property from Mr. and Mrs. Holiman, in Malvern, Arkansas. Plaintiff, a resident of
Minnesota, employed the services of Mr. Lawrence in connection with the purchase.
After placing a $400.00 deposit on the property, plaintiff had the following conversation
with Mr. Lawrence.
. . . find out if [Mr. Holiman] has insurance and how much and if you can
settle at sufficient coverage will you see if he can transfer it to me and I will
pay the premium. If you don't consider it sufficient premium, I want
insurance, because I want full coverage.
Id. at 307. Mr. Lawrence failed to transfer Mr. Holiman's existing policy or to procure a
new policy for the plaintiff. Less than two months later the properly was destroyed by
fire. Upon learning that he did not have coverage for his loss, plaintiff filed suit. Mr.
Lawrence did not deny that the above conversation took place; rather, plaintiff simply
asserted that because plaintiff did not tell him how much insurance he wanted, there was
no agreement to procure insurance.
The Lawrence court held that Mr. Lawrence was not entitled to a directed verdict.
The court found it persuasive that, as shown by another Insurance Agent in the area, a
request like the one made by plaintiff, in regard to insurance, "was a sufficient instruction
to any Insurance Agent to bind the risk and extend credit for the coverage.'1 Id at 308.
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The court had the following to say about Mr. Lawrence's actions:
Lawrence made no effort to have the Holiman fire insurance policies
transferred to [plaintiff]: Lawrence could and should have obtained the
same kind and amount of insurance for Francis that Holiman had. When
the deed was delivered to Lawrence .... Holiman told Lawrence that he
(Holiman) was canceling his insurance on the property. Certainly, on that
day Lawrence could and should have either taken over Holiman's fire
insurance policy for [plaintiff], or should have obtained other insurance of
like amount. Such was his promise to [plaintiff]. Lawrence failed entirely
to exercise reasonable care to perform his agreement with Francis as to
insurance.
Id at 309.
The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts of Lawrence. In this case,
Harris did not ask that Albrecht simply transfer an existing policy. Moreover, the policy
at-issue in Lawrence was relatively standard in form compared to that of a business
policy. Lastly, the conversation between the parties was much more detailed and
substantial than the conversation between Harris and Albrecht. Factually, Lawrence is
easily distinguishable.
Furthermore, Lawrence stands for the proposition that it is for the court to decide,
not the jury, whether the terms were sufficiently definite to be enforceable. It appears
that the appellate court in Lawrence, not the jury, undertook the job of deciding whether
the facts as presented at trial, and in the light most favorable to the insured, were
sufficiently definite to form a contract or duty to procure. The role of the jury would
have likely been to determine the breach of such contract or duty.
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The last case relied on by the Court of Appeals is Caddy v. Smith, 877 P.2d 667
(Or. Ct. App. 1994). In that case, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant
insurance agent for failing to procure workers' compensation coverage. The plaintiff,
while in the process of building a home, met with the defendant about obtaining
insurance coverage for potential liability related to the construction of the house.
Plaintiff and Defendant talked at length, and plaintiff went through a list of the things that
he wished to have covered. Plaintiffs request included the following: "There are a lot of
people wandering out there working on the job and I don't want any liability as far as any
of those people are concerned." Id at 668. The meeting concluded with the defendant
stating that "I'll take care of it for you" and the plaintiff stating: "Let me know how much
it is and I'll drop by a check." IdL
At some point during construction a worker was injured, and plaintiff was
subsequently found liable. Thereafter, plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for
negligent failure to procure insurance. IdL at 669. Defendant argued that because
plaintiff did not specifically request workers' compensation coverage, she had no
obligation to procure such coverage. The court disagreed, finding that plaintiffs request
that he be covered for any liability for those who were working on the job at the house,
along with other facts viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, precluded
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id
The facts in Caddy are, without doubt, entirely different from the facts in the case
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at bar. The plaintiff in Caddy made numerous requests to the defendant regarding
situations for which he wanted coverage. Moreover, the plaintiff specifically requested
that he be covered for injuries sustained by "people wandering out there working on the
job." Without actually saying the words "I want workers' compensation insurance" it
would be hard for plaintiff to have made the request any more specific. Additionally,
plaintiffs statements make it clear that he believed the defendant had all the essential
information and that there was nothing more for him to do than to simply "drop by a
check."
In this case, however, the conversation between the parties was entirely dissimilar.
Harris made no specific requests as to the types of coverages he wished to purchase.
Furthermore, Harris was aware that Albrecht needed more information than he received
through Hams' request. According to Harris' own testimony, Albrecht expressly told
Hams that "[Albrecht] would come out and look at the equipment." R. 186 (pp. 107-09).
Furthermore, in Caddy, a jury was called upon because there were disputed
subsidiary facts underlying the legal question of tort duty, such as whether the insured's
request for insurance would have reasonably signaled that the request was for workers'
compensation insurance rather than a regular home owner's policy. No such issues are
presented by Albrecht's Motion for Summary Judgment, which was whether the contract
contained a meeting of the minds on essential terms or was too indefinite to be
enforceable. Finally, the Caddy court never came out and declared, as did the Court of
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Appeals in this case, that the jury would ultimately decide whether the agent had a duty
to procure insurance.
Thus, the cases relied on by the Court of Appeals are distinguishable from the case
at bar.
In summary, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the question of whether a
contract to procure insurance was formed in this case was ultimately a question of fact.
There were no disputed facts for a jury to resolve since Albrecht's summary judgment
arguments were whether the terms of the contract as alleged by Harris were too indefinite
to be enforceable. If a jury were to supply the missing terms, it would have to engage in
pure speculation. The Court of Appeals therefore incorrectly held that the case should be
remanded to the jury.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
DECIDED THAT WHETHER ALBRECHT HAD A
DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE TO PROCURE
INSURANCE FOR HARRIS WAS ULTIMATELY
A QUESTION OF FACT.

A.

Under Utah Law, Whether a Tort Duty Exists Is Ultimately
a Question of Law.

The Court of Appeals erred when it decided that whether Albrecht had a duty of
reasonable care to procure insurance for Harris was ultimately a question of fact. It is
well founded that the issue of whether a tort duty exists is a question of law: u[t]he issue
of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law to be determined bv the court."
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DeBrv v. Valley Mortgage Co.. 835 P.2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quotation omitted);
see also AMS Salt Indus, v. Magnesium Coip. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997).
Because the existence of a tort duty is a question of law, negligence cases are
properly dismissed on summary judgment if the court determines as a matter of law that
no duty exists. See AMS Salt Indus., 942 P.2d 315. Therefore, whether Albrecht had a
duty to procure insurance for Harris is ultimately a question of law that should be
determined in Albrecht's favor on summary judgment if this Court finds that no duty to
procure exists.7 The Court of Appeals erred when it decided that the existence of a duty
to procure insurance is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
B.

The Court of Appeals Should Have Affirmed the Trial
Court's Legal Determination That There Was No Duty to
Procure as a Matter of Law.

The Court of Appeals should have affirmed the trial court's legal determination
that there was no duty to procure as a matter of law. This Court has not had occasion to
decide what is sufficient to trigger a duty to procure insurance, however, it is well
established that the duty to procure insurance sounding in tort does not arise until the
agent has contracted to procure the policy:
In the absence of an any agreement or contract to effect, maintain, or

7

As previously discussed, the way Albrecht framed his Motion for Summary
Judgment, there were no subsidiaiy issues of fact for a jury to decide. Rather, as Justice
Davis stated, the issue was whether the "given set of facts" gave rise to a duty to procure
insurance. Harris. 2002 UT App 98, ^f 31, 46 P.3d 241 (Davis, J., dissenting).
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renew insurance, no duty to do so arises. . . . An agent or broker is liable
to his or her principal if by his or her fault or negligence the agent or broker
fails to procure or renew insurance as the agent or broker contracted to do,
and as a result of the want of the insurance the principal suffers a loss.
Such liability exists as one for breach of contract or as a tort in negligently
failing to perform a duty imposed by contract.
Couch on Insurance §§ 46:49, p. 46-70, 71, 72; 46:65, p. 46-96 (3d ed. 1997) (emphasis
added).
The concept that an agent is not obligated to procure insurance except "as imposed
by contract" was illustrated in the case of Johnson v. George Tenuta & Co., 185 S.E.2d
732, 736 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972). In that case, the owner of a pier sued the insurance agent
because the agent allegedly agreed to procure "full coverage" on the pier, but when the
pier was destroyed by a storm it was discovered that the insurance was deficient to cover
the full amount. A directed verdict was granted to defendant when it appeared that there
was no consideration for the "contract" and where the promise to provide "full coverage"
was too vague. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that in addition to breaching the contract
to procure, defendant was negligent in procuring the requested insurance. The appellate
court stated that: "defendant could not be found negligent in failing to perform a duty
which he had never contractually undertaken to perform and which was not otherwise
imposed on him by law." Id; see also Bank of French Board Inc. v. Bryan, 83 S.E.2d 485
(N.C. 1954) (failure to procure actionable in contact or in "negligent default in
performance of duty imposed by contract") (emphasis added); Stockberger v. Meridian
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Mut. Ins. Co.. 395 N.E.2d 1272, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) ("If the agent undertakes to
procure the insurance and through fault and neglect fails to do so, the agent or broker may
be liable for breach of contract or for negligent default in the performance of a duty
imposed by contract"") (emphasis added).
Put another way, the duty to procure insurance does not arise until the prospective
insured makes a specific request for a specific type of insurance, with sufficient
instructions to allow the agent to know what to procure:
the liability of the agent for failure to procure insurance obviously could not
arise unless the agent had sufficiently definite directions from the principal
to enable the agent to consummate the final insurance contract.
IdL at 1279; see also Small v. King, 915 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Wyo. 1996) ("an agent1 s duty
to provide correct coverage cannot be triggered by a client's request for 'full coverage'
because the request is not a specific inquiry about a specific type of coverage").
Therefore, without the meeting of the minds sufficient to support a contract to
procure and without sufficiently definite instructions regarding what to procure, there is
no duty procure. There is logic in this because until the agent knows the essential terms
of the policy to be procured, he will be at a loss regarding what to procure. In the present
case, as fully set forth above in the section of this brief dealing with contracts to procure,
Harris frankly admits that he did not spell out the essential terms of the insurance he
wanted. Albrecht therefore owed no duty to procure sounding in tort as a matter of law.
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C.

Even If There Had Been a Duty, as Justice Davis Stated
There Was No Reasonable Reliance, and the Court of
Appeals Should Have Affirmed the Trial Court's Granting
of Summary Judgment.

Even if there had been a tort duty, Justice Davis was correct in his dissent by
stating that the third element of a negligent failure to procure claim was not met as a
matter of law, which requires that "the agent's actions warranted an assumption by the
client that he was properly insured."

Harris, 2002 UT App 98, T{ 11, 46 P.3d 241.

Harris claims that when Albrecht allegedly said that Albrecht would "take care of it" and
would come look at his equipment, then Harris was warranted in crossing it off his list
and never giving it a second thought. However, five months passed and Hams admits he
never received a policy in the mail, never received a bill, never paid a penny for business
coverage, never called Albrecht to follow up on the conversation, and that Albrecht never
came out to see Harris' business assets. Harris. 2002 UT App 98, % 38, 46 P.3d 241
(Davis, J., dissenting); R. 186 (pp. 117-121). Under these facts, Justice Davis was correct
to state that Harris did not reasonably rely on Albrecht to obtain the policy.
D.

Case Law Cited by the Utah Court of Appeals Is
Distinguishable from the Facts of this Case and Should
Serve as No Impediment to this Court Reversing the Court
of Appeals.

As discussed previously in this brief, the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals
to preclude summary judgment are either distinguishable based on the facts, or actually
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are supportive of Albrechf s motion. Having fully addressed those cases in the contract
to procure analysis, Albrecht will forego repeating that analysis here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Court of Appeals erred in remanding this case to the
jury. Defendants ask that this Court reverse the Court of Appeals' decision, and affirm
the grant of summaiy judgment in all aspects.
DATED t h i s / / day of September, 2002.
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>aul M. Belnap'
Byron G. Martin
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THORNS, Judge:
%1 Appellant Ken Harris iHarris; appeals rrom an order granting
summary judgment, dismissing his claims for breach of a contract
to procure insurance and negligence. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND1
\2
Appellee Rick Albrecht (Albrecht) is an insurance agent
for co-appellee State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State

1. We recite the facts in a light most favorable to Harris, the
non-moving party. See Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001 UT App
251,^10, 32 P.3d 990

Farm) . 2 Over the c o u r s e of several years, Albrecht and Harris
developed an o n - g o i n g ' b u s i n e s s relationship, wherein Albrecht
procured various types of insurance coverage for H a r r i s . This
r e l a t i o n s h i p began i n 1989, when Albrecht procured automobile
insurance coverage f o r H a r r i s . Subsequently, Albrecht procured
insurance coverage f o r H a r r i s ' s home, boat, RV, and a l i a b i l i t y
umbrella p o l i c y ,
if3
Albrecht and H a r r i s conducted t h e i r business l a r g e l y over
t h e telephone, " r a r e l y " d i s c u s s i n g the p a r t i c u l a r s of t h e various
types of coverage H a r r i s sought t o obtain from Albrecht.
According to H a r r i s , t h e two men talked on the telephone every
couple of months, and a l l b i l l i n g s and applications were handled
through the m a i l .
f4
In mid-summer of 1997, Harris telephoned Albrecht r e g a r d i n g
insurance coverage f o r h i s a r c h i t e c t u r e business. H a r r i s
r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n between the two was "very s h o r t . "
During t h a t c o n v e r s a t i o n , Harris told Albrecht that he "wanted t o
p l a c e coverage on [his] o f f i c e and i t s contents." In response,
H a r r i s contends t h a t Albrecht said "okay, he would take care
of
[ i t ] , he would come out and look an [my office] equipment. 3 "
%5 On December 1, 1997, a f i r e destroyed the building housing
H a r r i s ' s b u s i n e s s . That same day, Harris contacted Albrecht to
i n q u i r e about: the s t a t u s of h i s business insurance. H a r r i s askec
Albrecht: "You p l a c e d t h a t coverage we talked about, d i d n ! t
you?" Albrecht r e p l i e d :
"We talked about i t Ken [Harris] , but
we never did anything about i t . "
K6
On May 18,. 1998, H a r r i s brought claims against Albrecht,
Rick Albrecht Insurance Agency^, and State Farm ( c o l l e c t i v e l y
Appellees) for n e g l i g e n t f a i l u r e to procure insurance and breach
of a c o n t r a c t ' t o p r o c u r e insurance. Subsequently, on May 3 ,
2000, Appellees f i l e d f o r summary judgment, seeking d i s m i s s a l of
H a r r i s ' s complaint.
%7 The t r i a l court e n t e r e d i t s order granting Appellees 1
Summary Judgment Motion and dismissing H a r r i s ' s Complaint. The
t r i a l c o m : found t h a t "there was not a duty to procure insurance
and further no c o n t r a c t t o procure was made as the e s s e n t i a l

2. Albrechc's company, Rick Albrecht Insurance Agency, i s also a
co-appellee.
3 . Albrecht denies making such suanement. However, Albrecht argues
that: even if he did make such a statement, ic n e i t h e r e s t a b l i s h e d
a contract: : o procure insurance nor a duty to procure i n s u r a n c e .

terras of the proposed insurance contract were not agreed upon."
Karris aooeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
^8
Karris argues the trial court erred by granting Appellees1
Summary Judgment Motion. "Summary judgment should" be granted
only if there has been a showing that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001 UT
App 251,^10, 32 P.3d 990 (quotations and citations omitted).
Further, lf[i]n reviewing the district courtfs grant of summary
judgment, we review-the court's legal decisions for correctness,
giving no deference, and review the facts and inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Id. (quotations and citations omitted) .
ANALYSIS

^f9
Karris argues the t r i a l court erred by dismissing h i s claims
for negligence and breach.of a contract, to procure i n s u r a n c e .
I n i t i a l l y , we note t h a t a determination of whether an insurance
agent breached a duty t o procure insurance or whether t h e agent
breached a c o n t r a c t t o p r o c u r e insurance are matters of f i r s t
impression for t h i s c o u r t .
^flO As explained i n B a m e t t v. Security Insurance Co., 352
S.E.2d 855~ (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), an insurance "agent who, ' w i t h a
view t o compensation f o r h i s s e r v i c e s , undertakes to procure
insurance [for a customer and] f a i l s to do] so,
w i l l be h e l d
n
l i a b l e for any damage r e s u l t i n g therefrom.
Id. at 856-57
( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ; see a l s o Sanchez v. Martinez, 653 P.2d 897,
900 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). Further,
[u]nder such f a c t s , l i a b i l i t y may be
p r e d i c a t e d e i t h e r upon the theory that
defendant i s t h e agent of the insured and has
breached a c o n t r a c t to procure a policy of
i n s u r a n c e , or t h a t he owes a duty to his
p r i n c i p a l t o e x e r c i s e reasonable s k i l l , care,
and d i l i g e n c e i n securing the insurance
r e q u e s t e d and n e g l i g e n t l y f a i l e d to do so.
Sanchez, 653 P.2d a t 900-01.
^11 To e s t a b l i s h a claim for f a i l u r e to procure insurance, a
p l a i n t i f f must prove t h e following: (1) an undertaking o r
agreement by an i n s u r a n c e agent to procure insurance; (2) the

agent:! s failure to use reasonable diligence in attempting to
place insurance and his failure to notify the client promptly if
he has failed to obtain insurance; and (3) the agent's actions
warranted an assumption by the client that he was properly
insured. See Bonner v. Bank of Coushatta, 445 So.~2d 34,*37 (La.
Ct. App. 1934).
HX2 "In determining whether an agent has undertaken to procure
insurance, a court must consider the conduct of and the
communications between the parties and, more specifically, lthe
extent to which they indicate that the agent has acknowledged an
obligation to secure a policy.1" Baraett. 352 S.E.2d at 857
(citation omitted) . Further, "[wjhere an insurance agent . . .
gives some affirmative assurance, that he will procure . . . a
policy of insurance under circumstances which lull the insured
into belief that such insurance has been effected, the law will
impose upon the . . . agent the obligation to perform the duty
which he has thus assumed." Id. (quotations and citations
omitted). Finally, determining whether an agent has failed to
procure insurance is ordinarily a question of fact. See 3 Lee R.
Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 46:46 (3d ed.
1996) .
*[13 We find three cases to be helpful in determining this issue.
In Massenaale v. Hicks. 639 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), the
Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld a trial court1s decision
finding that the defendants4 breached an implied contract to
procure insurance for the plaintiff. See id. an 660. In
Massenaale, the plaintiff and the defendant insurance agent had
an existing business relationship spanning thirteen years. See
id.
*[14 In July of 1977, the plaintiff in Massencale received a
notice of nonrenewal of insurance, which stated that his
automobile insurance would expire at 12:01 A.M. on September 12,
1977. See id. The plaintiff rs mother immediately notified the
defendant of the notice, and the defendant said that he "would
take care of it." Id. Both the plaintiff and the plaintiff! s
mother subsequently discussed the insurance policy with the
defendant on numerous occasions. See id.
Hl5 On September 12, 1977, the plaintiff was involved in an
automobile accident. See id. However, the plaintiff was not
insured because the defendant had not renewed the insurance
policy. See id. As' a result, the plaintiff brought suit for
failure to procure a replacement insurance policy. See id. At
4. The plaintiff asserted the claim against both the insurance
agent and the insurance agency, Hicks and Associates, Inc.

trial, the jury determined that the defendant had indeed breached
his duty to procure replacement insurance
See 'id.
fllS On appeal, the defendants argued that both the "plaintiff
and his mocher knew that plaintiff would have to be covered by a
nonstandard insurance policy which, before it could become
effective, an application must be signed and premium paid in
full." Id, Accordingly, the defendants argued that the
"plaintiff knew that no insurance policy had ever been issued."
Id,
Hi7 The court concluded, however, that an "abundance of
evidence" existed "from which the jury could find" that the
defendant insurance agent agreed to procure replacement
insurance. Id. Finally, the court specifically pointed out that
11
[t] he contract here is not that a policy of insurance had been
issued but that [the defendant's] promises and actions were the
insuring agreement relied upon bv the plaintiff. " Id. (emphasis
added)fll8 Lawrence v. Francis, 267 S.W.2d 306 (Ark. 1954), although
dated, is also helpful. In Lawrence, the defendant was both a
real estate agent and an insurance agent. See id. at 3 07. The
plaintiff sought the defendant's services as a real estate agent
co purchase 2.5 acres of land, containing a home, garage, barn,
and chicken-house. See id. Following his purchase, the
plaintiff inquired of the defendant regarding the acquisition of
insurance for his newly acquired property. See id.
?19 At trial, plaintiff testified that he had the following
conversation with defendant:
Plaintiff:
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[I] asked [defendant] at that
time about insurance, I asked
him whether he knew [if the
prior home owner] had any
insurance on the property, and
[defendant] said he didn't
know. . . . I said, will you
see the [former owner] and
find out if he has insurance
and how much and if you can
settle at sufficient coverage
will you see if he can
transfer it to me and I will
pay the premium. If you cnn't
consider it'sufficient:
premium, I want insurance,
because I want full coverage.

Plaintiff:

[I] said, "and you [defendant]
w i l l take care of insurance?"
and he said, "Yes, y e s , " so I
considered the insurance would
be taken care of, being as he
was an insurance agent--in
t h a t business--and I had told
him t h a t I wanted f u l l
coverage.

Id.

^{20 The conversation between the two occurred on July 17th, and
on August 31st a fire destroyed all of the buildings on the
plaintiff ' s property. See id. The plaintiff learned of the fire
on September 7th and contacted the defendant regarding insurance
coverage. See id. The defendant, however, had not procured
insurance for the property. See id. at 307-08. The defendant
told the plaintiff that he could not procure insurance for the
property because he did not know the specific amount that the
plaintiff had intended to insure the property. See id. at 308.
The defendant's comment came despite the plaintiff's earlier
statement that he wanted "full coverage" on the property. Id.
^21 The matter was ultimately brought before a jury, which found
that defendant had ,ffail[ed] to obtain insurance on property in
accordance with an agreement." Id. at 306-07. On appeal, the
Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that an agreement to procure
insurance existed between plaintiff and defendant, based upon
their prior conversation, and that " [defendant] failed entirely
to exercise reasonable care to perform his agreement with
[plaintiff] as to insurance." Id. at 309.
^22 Further, the court explained that " [the defendant] , as a
real estate agent, had a commission coming from completing the
sale, as well as his profit from writing insurance, constituted a
sufficient consideration to support his promise to [the
plaintiff] to 'see about insurance.1" Id. at 303. The court
also explained that supporting testimony from another insurance
agent regarding the plaintiff's request "was a sufficient
instruction to any insurance agent to bind the risk and extend
credit for the coverage." Id.
<[23 Finally, in Caddv v: Smith, 877 P.2d 661 (Or. Ct. App.
1994), the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's
decision granting summary judgment and dismissing the plaintxrr ' s
claim for negligently failing to procure a policy of insurance.
See id. at 663.
In Caddv, the plaintiffs were building their own

home and spoke with one of t h e defendant's employees regarding
insurance coverage for p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y related to the
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the house. See i d . One of the p l a i n t i f f s
i n d i c a t e d t h a t he had t h e following conversation with t h e
d e f e n d a n t ' s employee:
I t o l d her t h a t I need some insurance, and
she said okay. And I s a i d I need the usual
kinds of t h i n g s i n case i t bums to the
ground, i n case t h i s and that in various
stages of c o n s t r u c t i o n and there are two
s p e c i f i c t h i n g s I want covered. And she said
okay. And I s a i d , "There are a l o t of people
wandering in and out of my house, . . . and
i n case one of t h o s e people f a l l s down, . . .
I want i t taken c a r e of." She said okay. I
s a i d , "there a r e a l o t of people wandering
out there working on the job and I don r t want
any l i a b i l i t y as f a r as any of those people
a r e concerned." And she said, . . . "Who's
the c o n t r a c t o r ? " I s a i d , "Well, I don't
know." . . . And she said, "Well who's
paying the b i l l s ? " And I said, "Well I am."
[Following anouher exchange of questions
between the two concerning the p a r t i c u l a r s of
the house, t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s employee
concluded:]
"Okay, I ' l l take care of i t for
you." And I s a i d "Okay. Thanks. Let me
know how much i t i s and I ' 11 drop by a
check."

IsL.
$24 The defendant procured a standard homeowner's insurance
policy for the plaintiffs- See id. The insurance policy
excluded workers' compensation coverage. See id. During
construction of the house, a worker was injured and subsequently
sought workers' compensation benefits. See id. at So9. The
Workers' Compensation Board determined that the plaintiff
homeowners were the injured worker's employers, and that the
"plaintiffs were noneomplying employers who were responsible for
paying for the injuries." Id.
$25 The plaintiffs subsequently brought a negligence claim
againsc the defendant for failing to procure workers'
compensation coverage and for failing to inform the plaintiffs
that they needed that coverage. See id. The trial court
dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on summary judgment:. See id.
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^26 On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's ruling. See
id. at 570. The court explained that although the plaintiffs did
not directly ask for workers' compensation coverage, the
plaintiff specifically requested insurance to cover "'any
liability'" for those who were "'working on the job.1'" Id. at
669. Further, the defendant's employee "asked a number of
questions about whether [the] plaintiff was the contractor and
whether the workers had their own insurance, and then assured
plaintiff that [the] defendant would take care of that request. "
Id. The court concluded: "That testimony, viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs, reasonably supports a finding that
plaintiffs provided sufficient information to defendant to give
rise to a duty to procure workers' compensation insurance." Id.
^27 Here, similar to Caddv, we must decide if the facts taken ir
the light most favorable to Harris preclude summary judgment.
First, Harris and Albrecht had an ongoing, eight-year business
relationship, during which Albrecht procured a multitude of
insurance policies for Harris. Second, the parties conducted
nearly all of their business transactions via telephone, and,
according to Harris, "rarely met face-to-face, if ever." Harris
also indicated that the two men talked on the telephone "every
couple of months." Third, Harris indicated that the two men
"'rarely' discussed the particulars of the various insurance
coverages Harris sought to obtain from Albrecht." Finally, and
most • importantly, Harris told Albrecht that he wanted to place
business coverage on his office and its contents, and, in
response, Albrecht replied that he would take care of it and that
he would come out and look at the equipment.
1(23 We conclude that the facts viewed in a light most favorable
to Karris, namely the conversation between the parties, their
long-standing business relationship, and the nature with which
the parties conducted their business, necessarily precludes
summary judgment.5

5. The dissent argues that we have failed to apply the third
element set forthr in Bonner, which requires a determination as to
whether the agent s actions warranted an assumption by the client
that he was orocerly insured. * See Bonner v. Bank of Coushatta,
445 So. 2d 84, 87 (La. Ct. App. 1984) . -We- are reluctant at this
stage of the litigation, as an appellate couzrc, to make such a
determination, which we believe is a proper question for the
trier of fact.

H29 The trial court's order granting summary judgment is
therefore reversed, and we remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with our decision.6

6.
The dissent concludes that "there was no agreement between
the parties sufficiently specific to create
either a contract to
procure insurance or a duty to .do so.u However, what this court
was called upon to decide was whether the facts taken in the
light most favorable to Harris preclude summary judgment.
Whether a contract to procure insurance or a duty to procure a
policy of insurance ultimately exists, are questions of fact best
left to the trier of fact. In sura, we do not decide today that a
contract or a duty exists, merely that Harris has presented a
genuine issue of fact as to whether either exists, which was
necessary to satisfy the hurdle of summary judgment.
Finally, we believe that the cases relied upon by the
dissent do not support its ultimate conclusion. Indeed, in Lewis
v. Pike, 6S3 P.2d'91 (Utah 1983) , summary judgment was proper
because (1) the plaintiffs expressly told the defendant "that
they would later contact 'him and inform him of their decision as
to whether they wanted joint insurance," id. at 92 (emphasis
added) / (2) the parties never spoke, either face to face or by
telephone, about-the defendant procuring an-insurance policy
after the plaintiffs had initially declined to pursue that
policy, see id. ; and (3) the parties had no prior dealings. See
Id. Accordingly, these facts are drastically different from
those we face today.
Moreover, the same- can be_ said ror Stockbercrer v. Meridian
Mutual Insurance Co. . 395 N,E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct App. 1979). In
Stockbercrer, as in the present matter, the parties had numerous
prior dealings and expectations that flowed from those dealings.
See id. However, in Stockbercrer, the plaintiff "was aware that
he had not provided [the defendant] !l
with specific information to
effectuate the [insurance] transfer, which he had always done in
the past. Id. at 1279. The plaintiff had also not received a
confirmation from the defendant that the insurance was
transferred, which was also customary in their prior dealings.
See id.
Here, taking the facts in a light most favorable to Harris,
there is nothing^to suggest that this dealing or the expectations
that flowed from -it Vera any different from their past dealings.
The two had conducted business, i^'this fashion in the past.
While • insuring Harris*s business
is different than that of
insuring his home and vehiclesr Harris has "established a pattern
of conduct from which a contract could be implied." Id. at'128 0
(emphasis added) . And, at this stage of the" litigation Harris
need do nothing more.
20001045-0*.
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NCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

DAVIS, Judge (dissenting) :
^[31 Because there was no agreement between the parties
sufficiently specific to create either a contract to procure
insurance or a duty to do so, I must dissent. See 3 Lee R. Russ
& Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance §§ 46.65 at 46-96, 46.68
at 46-99 (3d ed. 1996) ; see also Riddle-Duckworth, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 171 S.E.2d 486, 491 (S.C. 1969) (stating burden is on
plaintiff to demonstrate "with reasonable certainty the terms and
conditions of the agreement" to procure insurance, and for a
valid contract to procure, there must be "sufficient information
provided upon which to procure the policy") . This case was
appropriately disposed of by summary judgment because whether a
legal duty exists is a question of law and whether a contract has
been formed, based on a given set of facts, is also a question of
law. See Ferree v. State, 784 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (stating
whether a duty exists is. "entirely a question of law to be
determined by the. court:11) ; Weber v. Sorincrville City. 725 P.2d
1360, 1363 (Utah 1986) (same); Nunlev v. Westates Casing Servs.,
Inc. , 1999 UT 100,^17, 989 P. 2d 1077 ("Whether a contract has
been formed is ultimately a conclusion of law . . . .") .
^{3 2 The majority opinion misses the mark for three related
reasons. First, the majority misapprehends the appropriate
import of the prior dealings between the parties. Second, the
cases relied on by Harris and the majority are easily
distinguishable from the facts and inferences we have here, even
when viewed in the light most favorable to Harris. Finally, the
majority fails to analyze whether or not Harris's reliance en the
purported promise by Albrecht was reasonable. <}3 3 The majority notes that "Karris and Albrecht had an ongoing,
eight-year business relationship," ante at ^27, and goes to great
pains to point out how the two men conducted themselves during
these transactions. This would be important if the past dealings
helped to supply some of the missing terms necessary .to procure
an insurance policy on Harris's business. . See Hamacher v. Tumv,
352 P. 2d 493,~498 (Or. 1960) (noting that prior policies entered
into by the parties, could be relied on to-supply missing terms
necessary to enable .agent .to procure insurance) . - However, that
is not the case. here. All of the past dealings between "the two .men regarding insurance matters dealt with automobiles, boats,
and similar items that have a ready market and have easily
ascertainable values and standard insurance coverages--unlike a

business. The past dealings between the parries do not help
define what the terms of the alleged contract to procure
insurance were. In my view, the prior history between the
parries cannot be relied on to fashion a contract to procure
insurance that never existed in the first place due to an almost
total lack of agreed upon terms.
U34 Second, the three cases primarily relied on by the majority,
Lawrence v. Francis, 267 S.W.2d 306 (Ark. 1354), Caddy v. Smith,
877 P.2d 667 (Or. Ct. App. 1994), and Massenaale v. Hicks, 639
S.W.2d 659 (Term. Ct. App. 1982), are all inapposite. In all of
those cases, the agent knew, or should have known, exactly what
was needed to be covered due to either past dealings with the
plaintiff or from information specifically provided by the
plaintiff.
^35 Hicks is an automobile renewal case; the policy was already
written and all that had to be done was to renew it. See id. at
660. In addition, the plaintiff and his mother contacted the
agent a total of seven times in order to obcain the insurance.
See id.
13 6 Francis is to the same effect. There, the insurance agent
was also the realtor who sold the plaintiff the subject property,
see Francis, 267 S.W.2d at 307, and thus, the agent knew exactly
what needed to be insured. Moreover, there was already a policy
written in the former owner's name; all that was asked of the
agent was no switch it over to the plaintiff. See id. Thus, the
risk to be insured against, the premium, and the property at
issue all were known to the agent or easily ascertainable from
the prior policy.
13 7 Caddy also is unlike this case. There, the risk to be
insured against and subject property were specifically described
by the plaintiff to the agent.- See Caddv, 877 P.2d at 668-69.
The two cases would be analogous only if Harris had specifically
told Albrecht he wanted to insure against fire and then itemized
the property to be protected and assigned it a value.
*f3 8 Finally, the majority fails to apply the third element set
forth in Bonner v. Bank of Coushatta, 445 So. 2d 84, 87 (La. Ct.
App. 1984) ("the actions of the agent warranted an assumption by
the client that he was properly insured") . In order to recover
on either theory--the contract to procure or the breach of a duty
to procure--Harris must demonstrate that it was reasonable for
him to rely on the agent to obtain the policy. See Couch on
Insurance, suora § 46.72 at 46-107. Harris did not act
reasonably in relying on Albrecht' s purported statement that he
would "take care of it" when Karris had but one brief
conversation regarding an unknown and amorphous business policy
and, even though he admits having spoken with Albrecht on other
occasions, never followed up to see if the coverage had been
20001045-CA
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arranged, never received a bill over the course of several
months, and Albrecht never came out to see the property to be
insured.
^[3 9 In my view, this case is closer to Lewis v. Pike, SS3 P. 2d
SI, 92-93 (Utah 1983) (affirming a grant of summary judgmenc for
the defendant because there was no "specific order for
insurance") , than any of the three cases relied on by the
majority. Here, the actions of" Harris amounted -to little more
than an inquiry about insurance, see id. at 92, and fall far
short of creating a contract to procure insurance or creating a
duty to do the same. See Stockberaer v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co.,
395 N.E.2d 1272, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (stating the agent's
liability "-could not arise unless the agent had sufficiently
definite directions from the principal to enable the agent: to
consummate the final insurance contract," and noting that there
is a corresponding duty on the part of the insured to provide the
agent with necessary information) ; Boston Camping Distrib. Co. v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas, Co., 282 N.E.2d 374, 37S (Mass. 1972)
(holding statement by plaintiff to agent that he wanted coverage
from "A to Z, second to none" was not a contract to procure and
merely expressed an intent to obtain insurance) ; Wallis v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. . 4S5 S.W.2d 422, 425-2S (Tex. App. 1971)
(reversing a judgment for plaintiffs against agent and stating
that instructing the agent to procure insurance was not enough to
give rise to a duty to procure insurance, it merely indicated "a
desir^-«>>the part of plaintiffs to be insured") . Accordingly, I
re^^^ectfuljy dissent.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KEN HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING

RICK ALBRECHT; RICK ALBRECHT
INSURANCE AGENCY; and STATE
FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY,

CASE NO. 980404110
JUDGE: GARYD STOTT
CLERK: KES

Defendants.
The Motion for Summary Judgment made by Defendants Rick Albrecht, Rick Albrecht
Insurance Agency, and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company came before the Court for a hearing
on October 11, 2000. Counsel were present on behalf of their clients, and arguments were
presented with respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Having carefully reviewed the
memorandum, affidavits and exhibitsfiledwith the Court, and all documents in opposition to
Defendants' motion, and having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised, the Court
found that the Defendants' motion was well taken and should be granted. The Court stated from
the bench its observations with respect to its ruling. The Court then directed counsel for the
Defendants to prepare a judgment consistent with the relief requested and the ruling made and
submit it to the Court for signature. The proposed judgment has been received by the Court.
Plaintiff hasfiledan objection to the proposed judgment and has submitted his own proposed
order. The Court, after reviewing the proposed judgment, the objections and the proposed order
by Plaintiff, enters the following judgment.
1. Plaintiff Ken Harris ("Harris") is an architect with his place of business located in Utah
County.
2. Defendant Rick Albrecht ("Albrecht") is a licensed insurance agent and the owner of
Rick Albrecht Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Agency"). The Agency has an agreement with State
Farm's auto, life, and fire companies to sell State Farm insurance policies.

3. Plaintiff started obtaining personal lines of State Farm insurance through Albrecht or
his Agency in 1989. The personal policies obtained were auto policies, a homeowners policy, an
R. V. policy, a boat policy, and a personal umbrella policy.
4. Somewhere between 1989 and 1991, Harris contacted Albrecht and requested
information on a business policy for his architectural business. Albrecht claims he responded by
delivering a quote, with some options, to Plaintiffs architectural business, leaving the information
with an employee. Due to the passage of time, Albrecht can't remember what information he
provided. Plaintiff denies ever receiving the information. However, Plaintiff admits he elected
not to acquire business insurance at that time.
5. On December 1, 1997, a fire destroyed the building Plaintiff leased for his architectural
business. Plaintiff claims to have lost nearly all of his business property, valued by Plaintiff at
$1,143,855.50. Of this amount, $940,000.00 is allegedly attributed to the loss of architectural
plans and other valuable papers that were kept in his office.
6. This action is based on an alleged telephone conversation that, as claimed by Plaintiff,
took place in July or August of 1997. Defendants deny the conversation took place, but claim
that, even if it had, summary judgment is still appropriate. Based upon the material information
provided to the Court in support of and objection to the motion for summary judgment, the Court
finds that there was not an exchange of sufficient information between the Plaintiff and Albrecht
to have permitted the Defendant Albrecht to have issued a policy of insurance for Plaintiffs
business as required by the Plaintiff.
7. Defendants did not procure business insurance for Plaintiffs business before the
December 1, 1997, fire.
8. During the four to five month interval between the alleged conversation and the fire,
Plaintiff did not receive a bill, a policy, or a declaration page from Defendants. Plaintiff did not
make a payment for business coverage or complete an application. Plaintiff does not recall
Albrecht inspecting his business or talking with him further about potential coverage.
9. Assuming the facts most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that, even if the
alleged 1997 conversation occurred, Defendants did not have a duty to procure business
information for Plaintiff.
10. To establish that Defendants had a duty to procure, Plaintiff must prove the existence

of an agreement to procure insurance. Absent an agreement to procure, Defendants had no duty
to obtain insurance for Plaintiff under either a contract or a tort theory. The Court deems the
cases of Wallis v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.. 465 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) and
Hamacher v Tumv, 352 P.2d 493 (Oreg.1960) as being supportive of Defendants' position with
respect to the relief sought in the summary judgment.
11. There is no evidence from which the missing terms of the business contract could be
implied. The dealings between Plaintiff and Defendants on personal lines of insurance did not
supply the information needed for business insurance. The State Farm brochure produced by
Defendants to Plaintiff during discovery cannot create an agreement on the terms of the insurance
contract because Plaintiff didn't see the brochure or know of its contents until this litigation was
commenced.
12. The fact that Plaintiff didn't receive a bill, statement, insurance policy, declaration
sheet, or other communication regarding business insurance from Defendants during the four to
five month period between the alleged 1997 conversation and thefirefurther evidences that an
agreement had not been reached on the terms of a policy of business insurance.
13. Therefore, the Court concludes there was not a duty to procure insurance and further
no contract to procure was made as the essential terms of the proposed insurance contract were
not agreed upon.
14. Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of fact to be resolved and
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Based upon the abovefindingsby this Court, it is hereby ordered that Defendants' motion
for summary judgment is granted, and that Plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Defendants are awarded their costs incurred to date.
DATED this 3

day of /UfaC
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! to company tor higher Intits.)

5000

D Accts. Receivable (AR)

j TOTAL RC/ACV-BUS. PERS. PROP.

3,$

D Delete Loss of income

, Incidental
Number
Gas Pumps: j of islands

L Business Liability

+$

AWL tnct

;

$5,000

+

An*. tncL

;

$5,000

+

Adtfl Arm.

AdrftAi

D Other:

j$

Professional LiabBlty

D

M o n e y a n d Securities

(Ccnpawe Crime Section on back)

(Complete section on back)

Number of barbers*

D

No. of beauticians*.

'tnrtucNng owners, operators, partners, directors, and Independent contractors

n
D

Shampooers and manicurists?
DYes DNo
Pj Funeral Director's j r-. Include ambu- j Annual
Professional Liab. : lance service I receipts $
Hearing Aid Services
j Annual
n
u
Professional Liability
I receipts $
r-j Optician's
j Receipts
: only $
Professional liability
Q

M o n e y a n d Securities

D $1,000/$1.000
D$2.000/$1.000

D Other (show limits)

D Temperature Change

,

":$

D insured

D Mortgagee

D Servicing agent

DSFPP

orse. bills:

D Insured

D Mortgagee

D Servicing agent

DSFPP

2nd
3 Mtg.

Loss
D

Payee

Named Add'l Insured
D (em**! intere
Named Add'l Insured
D (.explatt Merest m Remarks)

*«•"•
$2,500

:
+

**»A

i$

Q Veterinarians
Professional Liability
D Other

D $8,000/$2,000
D $10,000/$2,000

ewal bills:

Loss
1 Mtg. D Payee

D Other

Propertyr of Others V(PO) I
!

D Other:

fCorrtiWaCtfrieSeci^cnfcic*;

D $4,000/$2,000
D $6,000/$2,000

$1,000/$1,000

Premium Subtotal

| Gross
j receipts $

< Surcnerpe «M apptcabte)

$

Amount Paid

$

•$

TOTAL
^
PREMIUM ~

; Balance Due

SFPP Account Number

•:$

(ON e name and address)

UNDERWRITING
USE ONLY
• Loan Number

Svc.

m

:$

Approved By j

Date

(Give name and address)

D Agt. .
Mtg. Subset Code

IFLATION COVERAGE NOTICE - TEXAS
>ur policy will automatically increase Its protection limits at each renewal. The
fcentage of increase will be at the same rate as the Increase in the Inflation
werage Index. The limits of liability will not be reduced unless you specifically
juest a reduction. If during the term of this policy the building or business
rsonal property Itmft is changed at your request, the effective date of this Inflation
verage provision is changed to coincide with the effective date of such coverage.
Tderstand that: D insurance is in force as of the effective date shown above.
D insurance is not in force. If accepted by State Farm's
Underwriting Department, insurance will be in force as of a
mutually agreed upon date,
n applying for the insurance indicated, and the information on this application is
rect. I understand that the premium shown above must comply with State Farm's
s and rates and may be revised.
tficant's
-*
lature X

Agent's Code Stamp

Date and Time
of Application
Day

&
&

""' ' Lesion of Honor

Da

1997 Designee

% RICK ALBRECHT INS AGY, INC 1423 *$
& SOUTHERN UTAH
F619$

UP

HARRIS ? , ALBRECH

00000327
ALSO COMPLETE OTHER SIDE
AGENT: After completing front,removpinn ««..<

Aw Structure Construction Type

j Frame ; Masonry; Masonry ; Noncombustibte ;

Is risk inside
city limits?

imber of real estate agents,
gmeers. and architects

Ve

* '• ** • If no. how far
j outside aty?

Distance
to

les the property have any
these protective devices?

r-j Local pull station
fire alarm

burglar alarm'
v

there a wood stove or furnace, coal stove or
e-standing fireplace anywhere on the property?
T I O N M B This location has
B or more of the following

1

: Yes : No j
;
:
:

primary
heat

• If no explain in Remarks

p Aux. j Number and type of
heat | lire extinguishers

Hot water heater or
nthmr
nraceitra u
occal
other pressure
vessel

(hot
water or steam)

n

Air conditioning or refrigeration unit (5 hp or more)

Breaker box or
cum»i-»h
o s r valued
wall
switch ngear
at $

n

•—' M
oernha a
n u optional
n r r f i m a l equtpment
o m u n m o n t tn
in Q
omarlrcl
(describe
any
Remarks)

• Policy
' number

>st recent
siness Insurer
s any insurer canceled or refused to issue or renew similar insurance to the
tied applicant within the past three years?
Ye»; NO ; a yeS complete
s the applicant had any losses (other than
j
! Loss section below
o). insured or not, in the past 3 years?
res

s building ever been
j
•
iverted or remodeled? '
'
IAT long has applicant owned
i operated this business?

No

Does this risk comply with ail CLM Basic Underwriting and
Business Underwriting Guide standards?

i there any suntanning beds or booths
ise at any of the insured locations?

If yes, list
in Remarks

• If yes, DO NOT BIND
j Applicant is unacceptable

Is any cooking done
on the premises?

Are alcoholic beverages sold
\
and consumed on the premises? :

Does the applicant operate shops to which this insurance will not apply?

OCERY & DRUG STORES.
>ss sales/receipts
$

as applicant sell, rebottle, repackage or manufacture products under (a) own label, or
the label of a franchisor under whose name the applicant does business?
ne and Use of Products

' | If yes, % of
I gross sales

j If consumed,
: DO NOT BIND

' j // yes, provide complete information in Remarks
! on dnvers and applicant s selection process

: Yes; NO ; // yes tio not
^^ Products Liability for the exposure Complete the
:
:
: following only if (b) applies and coverage for the exposure is desired.

[ Criemica! Composition or ingredients

any child care services
vided on the premises?

• If yes, number
: of children

'. Estimated Annual Sales

Does applicant operate a contract postal unit?

ASTAL AREAS ONLY. Is the nsk located within 1000 ft at high tide
an, gulf, bay, harbor open body of water, or located on an island?

frfr**aS»fe73:qo premises overnight $ *sa>'. 1 ^ ^->,

checks Stamped p j » j •*> I Type of
i <**•"•«*>
(tepp^bny?^^ j
| neighborhood I
Double cyfinder
D dead lock

Describe protection on
windows and skyfights
•

| Back or
: side door.

Other

n
u

Single cylinder
D dead lock

•

Double cylinder
dead lock

D Other .

INFORMATION FROM THE UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES INC CERTIFICATE
n Number (1,2 or 3)
elective

NAME OF ALARM COMPANY

-j Connected with alarm
company central station

If yes, give details in Remarks

• Yes | NO ; if yes g/ve
Date you personally
'
' dflte'fe in Remarks j surveyed premises

MPLETE ENTIRE SECTION FOR MONEY & SECURITIES.
MPLETE ONLY UNSHADED AREAS FOR FORM 3.

Single cylinder
D dead lock

: v«* ; NO : if yes> explain
j
I
\ in Remarks

« If yes, give name(s) and hcation(s) in Remarks

N" j If yes, do employees
•
: use their own vehicles? :

Does the applicant offer
pick-up or delivery service?

Yes | NO i if no, explain
',
', in Remarks

; Describe any vacant or
! unoccupied sections In Remarks
Are there other operations | Yes j N o \ If yes, explain
conducted by the applicant? I
j
; in Remarks

YM ; NO j Hours open
for business

• Is advertising reviewed
! by legal counsel?

RBER/BEAUTY SHOP
O F E S S I O N A L LIABIUTY:

; If yes. give previous insurance company, policy number and details in Remarks

j If yes, explain
List other occupancies
'in Remarks
| of the same building
Are there other kxations owned : * « ! • * >
j How long at
yrs [ or teased by the applicant?
I
:
: this location?

Tual cost
advertising $

terrr

'Complete part 2 of the
Crime and All Bisk section

j If building is over 25
; yrs old, give age ol.

Year
bunt

• Purchase
j price S

r-j Security
guard*

r-i Central station/propnetory
burglar alarm'

«*; •*> j Is each bulldmg/fire division
;
•
fully protected by automatic sprinklers? '

xas only. Does premium adjustment apply?

9 Of

; Pnmary servicing
ft : fire dept

Hydrant

! Servicing
: fire district

ime of pnmary
rvicing fire department

e of j Front
s
: doon

Is the building owned by a
condominium association?

• What percentage of business
% : is conducted off-premises?

What percentage of business done by
the applicant Is service and Installation?

Concrete metal wood steel deck etc.

Type
of roof:

Connected with gong
o n outside of building

n
u

Connected with
a police station

Key to premises in
*-• possession of alarm company

n

• Describe other protection features in Remarks
; (watchmen special alarms, watchmen's docks

etc)

•ICE BUILDING ONLY: DESCRIBE EACH OCCUPANCY IF OTHER THAN OFFICE, APARTMENT, BARBER OR BEAUTY SHOP

»r | Occupancy

Sq ft.

Occupancy

Sq ft.

Occupancy

Sq ft.

Occupancy

Sq ft.

Sq.ft.

Occupancy

Sq ft

«• : Occupancy
DMPLETE IF EXPOSING PROPERTY IS OTHER THAN
Exposures
Within 60 Ft

Construction

No of
Stones

DWELLINGS
Occupancy of
Exposing Property

Type of Loss (Property, Liability, Crime, etc.)

Exposures
W i t h * 60 Ft.

Total Amt of Loss

No of
Stones

Occupancy of
Exposing Property

Insurer (Policy Number, If Available)

1PLETE IF EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY COVERAGE IS TO BE PROVIDED
How often are bank
accounts reconcfled?

est amount of funds or securities
mptoyee may have at one time $
bank accounts reconciled by someone not | *•*'. "
prized to deposit or withdraw therefrom? I
!

j If yes, by whom?
I Give name(s) and positions)

frequently and by whom are
s made of cash and accounts?
names of persons
check signing authority:
HJtside employees
ct money?

YB« ; NO i if y 8 S now , s control maintained (daily reports,
I
': prenumbered sales slips, spot checks, etc)?

Is countersignature
of checks required?

; Yes; No

Bat*% enptoye*tofeebonded end at mvpkjyem nmd
•Aer 0 M bondtoIssued may be aakoet to compel*
fenPtoyee FiOetty Bond Oumationnan, FB64017

general Estimate)
Mcfefe Name or Initial

NAME
Please print

(
Number and Street

Mailing
address
Location of
property

Loc. No..

•

<" * t t s w V Uom " * * * *** wa}

COMMERCIAL COST GUIDE

Bldg. No.

Construction
classification:

•

Frame

•

Masonry

•

non-combustible

D

Other

•

Page No. Used .

CALCULATION

Masonry
non-combustible

1. Cost per square loot

Fire resistive

A. Building base cost per sq. ft.

Number
of stories:.

Exterior wall
:onstructioa- .
Quality of
construction:

Total sq.
t. area:
iasement Infinished _
Inderground
arking:

--,
L J Standard

,-,
L J Deluxe

Partial
finish _

sq.
. ft.
•

__
U Basic

B. BWevel adjustment

$- $-

C. Exterior wall adjustment

+ $-

D. Bldg. features adj. (sq. ft.)

+ $.

- $DNO

Yes - sq. ft. area

UILDING FEATURES ADJUSTMENT - Cost per square foot

- $-

ES

NO

H

D

_

D

ADD

Central air conditioning

$

3. Base cost

3

•

Fire alarm systems

$

4. Building features adjustment (total cost)

]

O

Fire detection systems

$

5. Basements

!

D

Plastered interior

$

A. Cost per sq. ft.

E. Total building cost per sq. ft.

No air conditioning
Through the wall air conditioning $,

I

DH
DB

)

2. Total building square foot area

.

Q

Sprinkler system

$.

Sq. ft. area

a

Tile roofing

$ _____

Basement cost

TOTAL

B. Cost per sq. ft.

$
(Item 10 In Calculation)

Sq. ft. area

LDING FEATURES ADJUSTMENT - Total cost

•

Balconies - #

•

__

Basement cost

$

Elevators - Freight-*

6. Other additional features

$

7. Total base cost

Passenger-* .
TOTAL:

8. Building quality adjustment factor

(Item 4 in Calculation)

PLETE FOR ACTUAL CASH VALUE ONLY
bunt

Building condition: •

jal percentage

— %

—

X

Excellent

Q Good

Average

9. Area adjustment factor
TOTAL REPLACEMENT COST (round to nearest thousand)

(See chart on page 2184)
** $

' ,

Cost

:ounts Receivable

•

„....

A. C V.

(Aff Risk - must be kept in metaf naceptactej

ables each month for past 12 months

QValuable Papers and Records (AC Risk}
Not kept in fire
LJ resistive receptacle

May $

Sep $_

Jun t,

Oct $_

___

Jul $

Nov $_

—_.

Aug $

Dec $_

Kept in fire
LJ resistive receptacle

Description of Items

.

Receptacle Manufacturer

a.15 Rev. 8-96

Describe Receptacle (sate, filing cabinet, etc.)

—1 Kept away
U from premises
Limit of Liability

ULC Label

COMPLETE BUILDING SCHEDULE AND REMARKS ON OTHER SIDE (IF NEEDED}

AGENT: A carton must be used tn rrunni*'

)ING{S)
PULE

Complete Commercial Cost Guide on the other side or Commercial Cost Guide Worksheet F72508 for each building type
Diagram position of building on separate sheet or attach copy of architect s plans tf possible and match number on diagram to Schedule
Limits of Insurance
Location of Property
Aux Wdg
Building
No No of No of
Business
2 Auxiliary
Year construe
(Number and Street City
construe
of
fire
units
persona!
1 Building
buBdmg
built
State ZIP Code)
tion
tion
stones dtv _ per div
property

H

personal
property

h-

'Indudes values for all outbuildings
fences swimnvng pools walkways hghtsl

Agent s Code Stamp

Date and Time
of Application
o I Day I ^

D a.m

Dpm

PY
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT, L.C., a
Limited Liability Company, and
OTTO BELVEDERE,
Plaintiffs / Petitioner,

ERIC ORTON, dba ORTON
EXCAVATION,

Case No. 990744-SC
ct. of appeals No. 980148-CA

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendant / Respondent

Priority No. 13

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

SCOTT L WIGGINS - Bar No. 582 0
MARK E. ARNOLD - Bar No. 3 758
ARNOLD Sc WIGGINS, P.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-4333
(801) 328-4351 (Facsimile)
Attorneys for Petitioner

Richard D. Bradford - Bar No. 0421
Kim H. Buhler - Bar No. 7155
Bradford & Brady, P.C.
389 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84 601
Attorneys for Respondent

FILED
MAY 2 2 2000
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

